

THIRTY FIVE CENTS

DECEMBER 1956

MONTHLY REVIEW

AN INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST MAGAZINE

ASSESSING THE DAMAGE

THE EDITORS

VOL. 8

8

RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM?

JOSHUA KUNITZ

The World of Science

PHILIP MORRISON

EDITORS . . . LEO HUBERMAN . . . PAUL M. SWEENEY

CONTENTS

VOLUME EIGHT NUMBER EIGHT DECEMBER 1956

REVIEW OF THE MONTH: Assessing the Damage	257
JUSTICE DOUGLAS ON RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM by Joshua Kunitz	273
THE WORLD OF SCIENCE: Two Notes on Fusion by Philip Morrison	283
CHINA'S GREAT ROAD by Arthur K. Davis	290
WORLD EVENTS by Scott Nearing	297

MONTHLY REVIEW: Published monthly and copyright, 1956, by Monthly Review, Inc.
EDITORIAL AND BUSINESS OFFICE: 218 West 10th Street, New York 14, New York. Telephone: Oregon 5-6939.

MAILING ADDRESS: 66 Barrow Street, New York 14, New York. Address ALL communications to 66 Barrow Street.

SUBSCRIPTION PRICE: One year—\$3.00 (foreign, \$3.50); two years—\$5.00 (foreign, \$6.00).
By 1st class mail — United States \$5; everywhere else \$6.

By air mail — No. America \$7; So. America \$13; Europe \$17; Asia \$24.

EDITORS: Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy.

NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

Our big news this month concerns MR Press's publishing plans. We have no fewer than four new books in the works now, all scheduled to come out during the winter and spring. Here is the list:

(1) *The Political Economy of Growth*, by Paul A. Baran, Professor of Economics at Stanford University. We are convinced that this is one of the most important theoretical works in the field of economics to appear since World War II.

(2) *The Chinese Economy*, by Solomon Adler, wartime United States Treasury attaché in Chungking who has more recently been at Cambridge, England. This book, which will be brought out simultaneously by Routledge Keegan & Paul in London, is the first authoritative description and analysis in English of the new Chinese economic system.

(3) *American Radicals*, edited and introduced by Professor Harvey Goldberg of the History Department of Ohio State University. This is a collection of essays by American scholars—some of which have appeared in MR—who are attempting to reassess the American radical tradition in the light of mid-twentieth-century problems and conditions.

(4) *The Theory of Capitalist Development*, by Paul M. Sweezy. This is a reprint of a work which has long been out of print and is in increasing demand, especially in the universities.

(continued on inside back cover)

ASSESSING THE DAMAGE

After nearly two weeks of eight-column banner headlines, the *New York Times* looked almost normal again on November 8th. A cease-fire had gone into effect in Egypt, the Hungarian uprising had been crushed, and President Eisenhower had been re-elected.

We write during a lull. The hope is that it will turn into a definite stabilization, but there is no assurance. About the best thing that can be said about the two weeks that followed the outbreak of fighting in Budapest is that we escaped a third world war. We shall be lucky if we continue to escape it.

There can be no pretense at this stage to anything like a full analysis or understanding of the new situation which has arisen. The following notes are not even intended to be connected or systematic. They express first reactions which are not only subject to change but in many respects certain to be changed. Their purpose is to begin the job of assessing the damage and finding out what attitudes and policies are appropriate in the new conditions.

The Invasion of Egypt

Israel's attack on Egypt was a clear case of provoked aggression, Britain's and France's of unprovoked aggression. There is a difference which everybody feels.

Unless their quick military successes go to their heads, the Israelis now have a chance to capitalize on the situation to further their true national interest. That national interest, it should never be forgotten, is to get on good terms with their Asian-African neighbors.

We base this judgment on the theory—or maybe it is only a hope—that Egypt may now realize that in pursuing a miserable vendetta against Israel she was playing the fool, inviting Israel to team up with the imperialist powers and endangering her own national existence. If Egypt does recognize this, she can hardly fail to see that her paramount interest now is to bury the hatchet with Israel and turn her energies against the real enemy, imperialism.

The Israelis, for their part, can have few illusions about the reliability or permanence of imperialist support. Their situation, indeed, is already a difficult one. Here is the way it is described by C. L. Sulzberger, foreign editor of the *New York Times*, in a remarkably frank and incisive column entitled "The Bill for Egypt:

MONTHLY REVIEW

"Nothing Fails Like Failure" (November 12):

They [the British and French] have had to withdraw their sudden and highly pragmatic support for Israel, which is now more isolated than ever. . . . The great Suez gamble has collapsed. The Israelis have incurred Moscow's open ire and Washington's pique. And there are indications London may yet sell them down the river if anything can be gained by an under-the-counter transaction.

The lesson of this experience, in other words, is surely the same for both Egyptians and Israelis. More powerful outsiders are ready and anxious to use their quarrels, but no one is going to look out for their interests. That they must do for themselves. If logic prevailed in international relations, the two countries would emerge from this crisis as allies against further outside meddling in the Far East. All of which, unfortunately, is not to argue that logic *will* prevail.

If the Israelis have at least a chance of saving something from the Egyptian adventure, the same can hardly be said of the British and French.

William J. Jorden, in a Moscow dispatch to the *New York Times* (November 8), reported that Khrushchev told a foreign diplomat the Russians couldn't understand what the British and French got out of their action in Egypt. One would have expected greater powers of comprehension in the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party: surely it was already obvious by that time that the British and French had got the worst defeat out of it that two would-be great powers have suffered since the collapse of Germany and Japan in 1945. From time immemorial, great powers have proved themselves "great" by starting wars and winning them. When they start a war and then, under pressure and threats, are forced to back down before their declared aims have been achieved, they prove two things: (1) that their leadership is blind and incompetent, and (2) that they are no longer great powers. The madmen in London and Paris attacked Egypt to save their empires; all present signs are that they have only succeeded in hastening the very process they wanted to halt. To quote Sulzberger again: "It now appears inevitable that the remnants of Britain's and France's imperial structures will disintegrate more rapidly than hitherto indicated."

At the same time, reports from all over Asia and Africa are to the effect that the strong stand taken by the USSR has resulted in a sharp rise in Soviet prestige throughout the two continents, and especially of course among the Arab countries. (The notion, so sedulously cultivated in the West, that this will be offset by Russian actions in Hungary is based on a simple failure to understand one

of the most elemental of Asian-African attitudes: quarrels among Europeans are one thing, attacks by Europeans on Asians and Africans are another. Several centuries of history are summed up in this attitude, and it is not likely to be changed in any foreseeable future.) Moreover, the American policy of non-involvement, though clearly loaded on the side of the British and French, leaves the United States as the only Western power with any standing or room for maneuver in the Middle East. The area is now likely to become a battleground between American and Soviet influence, with Britain and France being increasingly pushed out both politically and economically.

In the meantime, there is no use blinking the fact that if the Soviet Union rushes in too fast or tries to push its advantage too hard, there will be a very real danger of a major conflict leading to war. The best hope of peace remains, as we have insisted all along, in the Western powers' frankly admitting the legitimacy of Soviet interests in the Near and Middle East, and on this basis attempting to negotiate an overall settlement (the terms of which would doubtless have to include Europe and the Far East) which it would be in everyone's interest to observe. The policy of trying to exclude the Soviet Union has led to the present fiasco, and if it is persisted in may lead to worse.

The Hungarian Tragedy

An uprising of classic form and proportions took place in Hungary. It was drowned in blood by the Soviet army. These are simple facts which no amount of arguing and no conceivable new evidence can change.

After these events, we do not see how the feelings of any socialist toward the Soviet Union can remain unchanged. Any claim the Soviet Union had to moral leadership of the world socialist movement is now extinguished.

In saying this, we do not mean to imply that the Soviet crime in Hungary is unique. It is similar to crimes that have been committed a hundred times in the history of imperialist expansion—to that, for example, which the French are committing right now in Algeria. That most Americans and Europeans will make a sharp distinction only proves that they value the liberty and lives of advanced white peoples more than they do of backward colored peoples.

But the Soviet action in Hungary was a crime nevertheless, and it is more, not less, reprehensible for having been committed by a socialist country. No attempt can or should be made to conceal or minimize the enormous damage done to the cause of socialism in the last days of October and the first days of November, 1956.

What really happened in Hungary? What went wrong? What

MONTHLY REVIEW

caused the final Soviet intervention?

These questions will long be debated, but some things seem reasonably clear even now.*

First, the situation in Hungary which gave rise to the Revolution was bad. We shall return to this later.

Second, the uprising received its initial impulse from events in Poland; it started as a peaceful demonstration for reform of the existing regime, not for its overthrow; and there is no reason to doubt that if the Hungarian Communist leadership and the Soviet authorities had acted with reasonable wisdom and moderation there need have been no bloodshed at all.

The demonstration of October 23rd was organized and led by intellectuals and students. Its demands were for national independence and equality, democratization, and improved living conditions. It remained within the framework of socialism, and in terms of personalities called only for the reinstatement of Imre Nagy as head of the government in place of the Geroe-Hegedus team, both of whom were discredited, the one as the accomplice the other as the stooge of Rakosi.

At 8 o'clock in the evening of October 23rd, Geroe, fresh from a conference with Tito in Belgrade, addressed an excited and expectant crowd of 100,000 or more in front of the Parliament building. His speech, according to the *Avanti* correspondent, "was the most absurd, the most dangerous, the most provocative that it would be possible to imagine." He recognized the need for some reforms, but chided the demonstration for its nationalism, praised the Soviet Union, offered no immediate concessions, and announced that the Central Committee would meet to consider the situation—a week later! According to Fossati:

The incredible statements of Geroe served to throw oil on the flames. They gave a new impetus to the revolt and hardened it. Until 8 o'clock in the evening—I can affirm from having talked with scores of demonstrators—the announcement of energetic measures, the accession of Nagy to the premiership, and doubtless also the anticipated convocation of Parliament would have sufficed to save the situation.

What happened was very different. A detachment of demonstrators set out for the radio station to force the staff to broadcast

* For what follows we have drawn heavily on the November 1st issue of *France-Observateur* which contains (1) an eye-witness account of the events of October 23rd in Budapest by Luigi Fossati, special correspondent in Hungary of *Avanti*, organ of the Italian (Nenni) Socialist Party; and (2) a careful reconstruction of the events of the next week by François Fejto, *France-Observateur's* specialist on Eastern European affairs.

REVIEW OF THE MONTH

their demands. The security police intervened and opened fire. The first victims fell, and the whole situation was transformed.

Meanwhile, the Soviets for their part had embarked upon a dangerous course. Even *before* the demonstration began, Soviet troops had begun to prepare for action, seemingly in repetition of Rokossovsky's abortive attempt to squelch the Polish revolt before it got started. Only this time there was no Gomulka to stand up to the Russians; instead there was a Geroe to call them in and turn them loose on his own compatriots.

After the bloodshed of the night of October 23-24, it may be doubted whether anything could have saved Hungary from disaster. Nagy, who would have been in a commanding position the day before, came to power already badly compromised by his predecessor's criminally stupid—or could it have been deliberately provocative?—conduct. He strove manfully to master the situation, but it appears that he was never very close to succeeding. In any case, every concession was interpreted as a sign of weakness and brought further demands. As always during revolutionary situations, the pendulum swung from the less extreme to the more extreme opponents of the *status quo ante*. By November 4th, emigres from the West were returning, the Church seems to have been the only organized nationwide force, Cardinal Mindszenty was back in Budapest in triumph, and the signs of an incipient white terror were in evidence.

While all this was happening, the Russians were temporizing, apparently undecided what policy to follow. They offered to quit Budapest if the insurgents would lay down their arms, while the insurgents insisted that the Russians must withdraw first. On October 30th, Moscow issued a statement outlining a much more liberal policy towards the satellites and offering to discuss the withdrawal of troops from all the Warsaw Treaty powers. Shortly afterwards, reports of Soviet reinforcements entering Hungary became increasingly frequent. One got the impression that the Soviet leadership was divided and that contradictory policies were being followed simultaneously. Then, all of a sudden on November 4th, the Russians struck, dispersing the Nagy government and installing a new one under the leadership of Janos Kadar who had replaced Geroe as First Secretary of the Communist Party in the early days of the uprising.

What was behind this Russian move? Was it fear of the consequences in the other satellites if the Hungarian revolution should be allowed to run its course? Was it determination to prevent the advent of a clerico-fascist regime in Hungary? Was it a shift in the line-up within the Soviet leadership? Was it perhaps something like an ultimatum from the big brass of the Red Army to Khrushchev and Bulganin? And what part did the Anglo-French attack on Egypt

MONTHLY REVIEW

play in the Russians' thinking: did they figure that it would divert attention from Hungary and give them a chance to recoup whatever losses might be incurred, especially in the eyes of African and Asian peoples?

Probably some combination of these various reasons was involved. It makes little difference now, because the result was the same in any case.

It is easy to say—and we have heard it from impeccably anti-Soviet conservatives—that as a great power the USSR had no choice: she could not permit a hostile regime on her borders and risk the disintegration of her influence on her entire western frontier. It is a good military argument—insofar as military arguments are ever any good—and we can be sure that Generals Zhukov et al urged it with all the force at their command. But it is not conclusive, and as socialists we would have preferred to see the Soviet Union take the chances of withdrawal rather than pay the heavy and certain price of following in the footsteps of the Tsarist armies of 1848.

A Stalinist Failure

When a murder is committed it will not do to center all attention on the circumstances surrounding the actual firing of the fatal shot. One must probe into the background to understand the whole situation and to take effective steps to prevent recurrence of similar crimes in the future. So it is with the murder of the Hungarian revolution on November 4, 1956.

We have already stressed that fatal mistakes were made by both the Hungarian Communist leadership and the responsible Soviet authorities on the very first day of the revolution. But for these mistakes, Hungary might very well be in the position of Poland today and the world might be a much easier and happier place to live in.

But we have to go further back than that. Why should a revolution be necessary at all in a socialist country? What went wrong?

In general terms, one can fairly blame Stalinist methods and their imposition on Hungary for the parlous state to which the country had been reduced by the summer of 1956. In spelling this out, we would be inclined to emphasize the following points:

(1) The basic structural reforms of Hungarian society which were accomplished in the first three or four years after the war had the support of all but the (numerically small) former privileged classes. It was the heresy hunt against Titoism and the intensified cold war of the late 40s and early 50s that disrupted Hungarian development and led eventually to crisis.

(2) The heresy hunt, prosecuted in Hungary with particular thoroughness and vindictiveness (doubtless because Hungary is next

door to Yugoslavia and has a long tradition of anti-Russianism), deprived the Hungarian Communist Party of its ablest people, turned most of the rest into mere yes-men, and put all power into the hands of Rakosi and the political police. The results were varied and disastrous. The brains and imagination needed to carry through the enormously difficult task of transforming a still largely feudal society into a modern socialist order were destroyed or effectively frustrated; instead, the country came under the full control of bureaucratic mediocrity. Cultural life was poisoned; and students and intellectuals were driven into secret opposition. Not only was Hungarian performance during the years after 1948 reduced to a level much below the people's potential, but the country's powers of recovery were permanently impaired. Can there be any doubt that if Rajk and the others liquidated with him were alive today, Hungary would have had a much better chance of mastering the recent crisis and going the way of Poland?

(3) In retrospect it seems clear that one of the very worst mistakes of the whole Stalinist era was the attempt to militarize the satellites as the cold war grew more intense from the time of the Czech coup and the Berlin airlift, and especially after the outbreak of shooting war in Korea. At best, backward countries have very little disposable surplus to turn to the purposes of economic development. If an attempt is made to superimpose a big military burden on an ambitious development program, the result is sure to be declining living standards and growing economic dislocations, leading eventually to a full-fledged crisis. There can be no doubt that this is what happened, in varying degrees, in all the countries of Eastern Europe.* One could, of course, argue that if the immediate danger was great enough, even such a price was not too heavy for a rapid build-up of military strength. But the argument holds only on the premise that the outcome really was military strength, and it is precisely this premise that we can now see to have been false: when trouble developed in Hungary, the Hungarian army fought for the most part against and not with the Russians. The sad and ironic truth seems to be that the attempt to militarize the satellites created both economic *and* military weakness. How much better off the Russians themselves would be today if they had trusted in the Red Army to defend Eastern Europe and allowed their neighbors to stick to their economic knitting!

* A graphic picture of this process in Poland can be found in an article by Oscar Lange, published in Poland in July, 1956, and made available in French under the title "Sens du nouveau programme économique" in *Cahiers Internationaux*, September-October, 1956, pp. 72-81. Hungary being an economically less advanced country than Poland, there is every reason to believe that the situation there was at least as bad and probably worse.

MONTHLY REVIEW

There is surely a moral in all this: never trust military thinking even if it emanates from socialist militarists.

(4) Two other major contributory causes to the failure of Stalinist satellite policy call for mention. One was the setting up of extravagant and unrealizable industrialization goals. It is true that the Russians did it to themselves—and then realized the unrealizable. But the Russian situation was unique,* and in any case there was no need to impose superhuman tasks on the satellite economies.

The second contributory cause was the imposition by the Russians of prices and terms in their trade with the satellites which were definitely unfavorable to the latter. This was in conflict with the setting of extravagant industrialization goals and helped to insure that they would not be achieved. The simultaneous pursuit of such manifestly incompatible policies was one of the characteristic contradictions of Stalinism. The determination to industrialize the satellites, however ineptly it was implemented, reflects the socialist character of Soviet society and proves conclusively that the USSR is *not* an imperialist power in the sense that the capitalist powers are imperialist. On the other hand, the attempt *simultaneously* to exploit the satellites proves that Soviet society still retains many of the ugliest qualities of the Tsarist and capitalist past.

Poland's Achievement

Poland's history since World War II has run parallel to Hungary's with seemingly small, but as it now appears crucial, differences. In both countries, the Communist and Socialist parties merged in a sort of shot-gun wedding, but in Poland the pre-war Socialists occupied much more important positions in the new set-up. The Communists in Poland were several cuts above their Hungarian counterparts—compare, for example, Beirut, a relatively popular figure with real roots in the Polish working-class movement, with Rakosi, the very prototype of a Moscow stooge. Rajk and Gomulka played similar roles in 1948-1949: Rajk was liquidated, Gomulka was merely imprisoned. The result of these (and other) differences was

* A fascinating subject which unfortunately we cannot pause to dwell on here. But we cannot refrain from suggesting two of the factors involved. (1) The Russian Revolution was a heroic achievement, made against the unanimous opposition of the world's great and powerful; it called forth enthusiasm and energy which normally lie dormant in the human psyche. (2) The Russians were fortunate to have extraordinarily able leadership. (This of course applies to Stalin as well as to Lenin, Trotsky, and many others: the present is a period when Stalin's weaknesses are very properly to the fore, but it would be ridiculous to overlook or deny his outstanding ability.) In both these respects, there are strong resemblances between the Russian and the Chinese revolutions, and just as strong contrasts between the Russian and Eastern European revolutions.

REVIEW OF THE MONTH

that when the crisis came last month, Poland both stood up to the Russians and was able to install fresh leadership with sufficient strength and ability to steer a new course without losing control of the rudder.

Poland's achievement commands general respect and cannot but inspire a feeling of pride and hope in every socialist. It is hardly an exaggeration to say, indeed, that it is the one bright spot in these dark and ominous weeks. But there is no ground for undue optimism. Poland is by no means out of the woods yet, and the longer-run future is beset with pitfalls and obstacles.

The immediate danger stems primarily from the Soviet Union.* We are not suggesting—nor do we believe—that the Russians are likely to use outright strong-arm methods on the Poles just now. But it is apparent that they are putting all kinds of pressure on the Poles to keep them in line with Soviet ideas and policies, and if they go too far in this direction there is a danger that they will undermine the regime's popular support or force it into outright repudiation of the Russian alliance. We shall touch on the reasons for such behavior on the part of the Russians presently; for the moment, we note what seem to us to be two indisputable facts: (1) the Gomulka regime needs every bit of popular support it can possibly muster, and (2) vis-à-vis the USSR, what is called for is not a repudiation of the Polish-Soviet alliance (which would immediately put Poland back into the old German-Russian vise) but its redefinition and stabilization on the basis of equality between the partners. Poland is walking a tightrope—and there is no net below to catch her if she falls.

For the longer run, Poland's problem is the economic transformation and development of a still relatively backward economy under limiting conditions which are certain to make the task extremely difficult and delicate. For the new Polish regime, there can be no question of a return to anything like Stalinist methods of coercion: the path of liberalization and democratization which has been entered upon is a one-way street. But given the structure of Polish society, democratization inevitably means more or less "peasantization," and to preserve its working-class base, the socialist leadership will have to make extensive concessions to urban consumers. All in all, peasants and consumers are certain to carry much more weight and to get a better break than has been the case up to now. But this means that the surplus available for economic development will be cut. The great danger is that it will be so drastically cut that the

* The latest news (November 19) of the agreement reached at the Moscow meeting of Poles and Russians indicates that our fears in this connection may have been groundless and were certainly exaggerated.

MONTHLY REVIEW

whole process of transforming Polish society into a modern industrialized, socialist order will be completely stalled. If so, the outlook would be for a slow growth of rural capitalism, followed by a gradual reversion to the bad old days of economic stagnation and political corruption.

The danger is terribly real. The full transformation of a backward economy is an enormously difficult process which has been solved successfully only a few times in history. There is no assurance whatever that the Poles in their present special, and perhaps even unique, circumstances will be able to pull it off.

On the other hand, we do not judge that the prospect is hopeless. *If* the country's economic machinery is overhauled to promote maximum efficiency and to enlist the enthusiastic cooperation of the workers; *if* the military burden is reduced to minor proportions; *if* foreign assistance, from the Soviet Union or the United States or both, is forthcoming where and when it is most needed—if these and other things should happen, then the Poles will have a good chance of successfully solving the greatest and most important problem that has ever faced them. But these are big *ifs*, and the Poles will need all the help and luck that a benevolent goddess of history can confer upon them. Unfortunately, she usually isn't very benevolent.

Soviet Dilemmas

Some observers seem to think that they have said something quite profound and illuminating when they predict a process of "re-Stalinization" in the Soviet Union and the satellites which have not yet experienced their revolutions. Actually, the process has been under way since the Poznan riots of last June, and it goes without saying that it will receive a stimulus from events in Hungary. Moreover, it is part of the normal pattern of Soviet political history, which has always proceeded by a series of violent lurches from one side of the main path of development to the other.

We have little hesitation, however, in stating that re-Stalinization is not and cannot be the main path of development itself. There may be individuals in the Soviet leadership who would like to turn the clock back, who yearn for the good old days when Uncle Joe cracked the whip and everyone else jumped through the hoop. But actually the good old days are a myth and any serious or prolonged attempt to return to them could only lead to a disaster which would make the Hungarian tragedy look small by comparison. What must never be forgotten is that it was the growing contradictions and tensions of the Stalinist system which forced the Soviet leadership to undertake the project of dismantling it. They have certainly bungled the job, as Hungary shows, but the greatest fallacy of all

REVIEW OF THE MONTH

would be to imagine that the appropriate remedy would be to try to pick up the pieces and put the old structure back together again. Whether they like it or not—and a good many of them pretty obviously don't like it—they are going to have to keep on with the job. The big open questions are whether they can learn from their mistakes and avoid more of the kind of appalling human costs involved in the Hungarian explosion.

In a peculiar way, Hungary itself, a week after the big Soviet crack-down, confirms this diagnosis. The Kadar government seems to have taken over the entire program of its predecessor with the single exception of the repudiation of the Warsaw treaty. On November 12th, the *New York Times* reported that Kadar himself was seeking the collaboration of Nagy, that he had renewed a promise to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union for the withdrawal of troops from Hungary as soon as order was restored, that he had pledged that "representatives of all parties would be admitted to 'all stages of public life,'" and that his government "would tolerate no revenge against the participants in the uprising." If Kadar is, as the newspapers say, a mere puppet speaking with the voice of Moscow then we are obliged to conclude that Moscow has come a long way in the last few weeks: imagine a Stalinist talking like that. If on the other hand, Kadar is not a puppet, then Hungary seems, despite the bloodbath, or perhaps even partly because of the bloodbath, to be already on the way to achieving the same status of relative independence that Poland occupies. The paradoxical irony of the situation is that the Russians suppressed the Hungarian revolution but are going to have to bow to it all the same; the tragedy is that the same results could and would have been achieved without the bloodshed and hatred which will poison Hungarian-Soviet relations for years to come.

Evidently we have to do in Eastern Europe with extremely powerful historical forces which no country, no matter how strong it may be, can hope to suppress. The re-Stalinizers may not realize this and they may still do enormous damage in making the attempt. But they will fail, just as they have failed in the past. The best hope now is that their comeback will be short lived, that the Soviet leadership as a whole will take the bitter lessons of the Hungarian affair to heart. If that should happen, we could at least say that the brave men and women who fought and fell in Hungary did not die in vain.

Intensified Cold War?

The Stalinizers' opposite numbers in the United States are the cold warriors. They lost a lot of ground in the last few years and

MONTHLY REVIEW

have quite naturally seized upon the Hungarian revolution as a hopeful opportunity to stage their own comeback. Their reasoning is well stated in an editorial in the *New York Times* of November 9th entitled "The New Stalinist Threat":

All these developments [in Eastern Europe and the Middle East] have shattered almost over night the complacency of the free world which, deluded by the Soviet "new look" policy, started to reduce its armaments and even its psychological defense readiness. In this country we even toyed with the idea of foregoing the draft and halting the development of our atomic arms.

But whether the shock of recent events will produce the same results as did the Berlin blockade and the Korean war that led to the Western alliances and Western rearmament remains to be seen. That steps along similar lines are urgently necessary is evidenced by the new strain on the Western alliances, by the dispersal of Western forces and the insecurity of Western bases, and not the least by the delay in the projected German rearmament that was to fill a dangerous gap in the front line of North Atlantic defense. The speed with which these defects are remedied may decide the future of the Western World.

Here, as in the case of the Stalinizers, we see the nostalgia for the good old days of the Berlin blockade and the Korean War. How much easier it was when America's allies fell meekly in line and Congress voted ever more enormous arms appropriations without batting an eyelash or asking a question!

The danger of an intensification of cold war from the American side should not be underestimated, if only because of the colossal vested interest of Big Business in the military budget. But on the other hand, and despite superficial appearances to the contrary, the underlying situation is not favorable for the cold warriors. Hungary is a sign of Soviet weakness, not strength. The Middle Eastern crisis results from Anglo-French, not Soviet, aggression. The two great military blocs of the cold-war era are manifestly loosening up; and the H-bomb stalemate, which was perhaps more responsible than anything else for cooling the hot heads on both sides, still stands and will doubtless continue to stand for as far into the future as we can now pretend to see. Taking all relevant considerations into account, we are inclined to the view that the cold war may get a good-sized fillip, but that if peace is successfully restored in the Middle East it is unlikely to be revived on anything like the scale of several years ago.

The New International Line-up

Much has already been written about the larger changes in in-

REVIEW OF THE MONTH

ternational relations which can be expected to result from the Hungarian and Middle East crises. Two themes seem to predominate in this spate of commentary: First, as indicated above, the two great power blocs are losing their former tightness and cohesion. The United States and the Soviet Union are no longer able to make their allies dance to any tune they select. Second, the utter failure of the Anglo-French intervention in Egypt shows that even powers as large and militarily strong as Britain and France cannot attempt to pursue an independent course in international affairs. In the words of C. L. Sulzberger: "It becomes apparent that the role, at this historical juncture, of any but a superpower is pitifully limited. The only two Western allies with apparent freedom of action have demonstrated that, in reality, no such freedom exists." (*New York Times*, November 12.) What no one seems to have noticed is that if you add these two themes together you come out with the conclusion that the freedom of action of *all* kinds of powers, great and small, has been reduced. Yet this is undoubtedly true.

The reasons, of course, are varied. With the decline of their empires, Britain and France have ceased to be world powers. The United States and the Soviet Union are still world powers, but their ability to impose their wills on their respective allies stemmed largely from temporary circumstances arising from the dislocations and social upheavals of World War II and its aftermath. If they had used that ability wisely and sparingly, they might have been able to preserve a large part of it even into the new era of more or less "normalcy" which was bound to set in sooner or later. But they both acted overbearingly and too often in direct contradiction to the interests of their allies. Under the circumstances, it was only a matter of time before their right to dictate to their allies should be successfully challenged. This is not to say that they have lost all of their power, of course, only that their power is a good deal more circumscribed than was generally assumed prior to the present upheavals.

The new situation may develop in many directions which we cannot even hope to enumerate at this stage. It must be sufficient to mention three possibilities: (1) The loosening of the cold-war coalitions may well continue, with some of the members from both sides tending to come together and to join up with the presently uncommitted powers in a growing "neutralist" camp. This tendency will probably receive further impetus when all the internal political implications of the present crises have had a chance to work themselves out. Britain is likely to be a particularly important country in this connection. The Labor Party now seems likely to come to power much sooner than anyone would have dared predict a few weeks ago, and it is likely to be a leftward-moving Labor Party.

MONTHLY REVIEW

The result could be important realignments both in international relations generally and in the international socialist movement specifically. (2) In areas from which British and French power and influence are being expelled—especially North Africa and the Middle East—rivalry to fill the vacuum between the United States and the Soviet Union is likely to become increasingly keen. (3) Finally, there will always be a temptation for the United States and the Soviet Union to get together to divide up the world into spheres of influence (very possibly explicitly recognizing “neutralist” no man’s lands in between) and for each to agree to give the other at least tacit support in running its sphere its own way. In this way, they could both more than recoup the loss of power which they have suffered during the last few weeks. There is reason to believe that the Soviet Union would be prepared to enter into some such deal tomorrow. The United States, on the other hand, is still a long way from thinking in these terms, and may never come to it. But the objective conditions are unquestionably ripe, and it is always wrong to assume that subjective conditions are immutable.

Turning Point for Western Socialism

As we said at the outset, the cause of socialism has suffered severe damage as a result of the Hungarian tragedy. But there may be compensations.

As far as the West is concerned, it seems probable that Hungary has given the *coup de grace* to Communism as we have known it during the past three and a half decades. The Soviet-oriented, tightly disciplined, highly dogmatic party was already seriously discredited by Khrushchev’s revelations at the Twentieth Congress and the subsequent de-Stalinization campaign. It is hard to see how it can survive this latest blow. This does not mean that the Western Communist Parties are literally going to disappear, but it does mean that more than ever their capacity to grow and to play a real role in the political life of their respective countries must depend on their ability to transform themselves into indigenous socialist groups capable of working out their own strategy and tactics in their own peculiar national settings. Failing this, they will tend to degenerate into rigidified sects of a kind with which we in this country are all too familiar.

Social Democracy has fared less badly. True, the French Socialist Party has disgraced itself by assuming leadership in the imperialist attack on Egypt. But the British Labor Party has played an altogether honorable role in the same situation, a fact of which all socialists everywhere can be proud. In these searing days, how many times have we not felt a deep gratitude to our British brothers for

REVIEW OF THE MONTH

upholding the honor of socialism!

Out of all this, there may come new life and new alignments. In France, for example, both the Communist and Socialist Parties would seem to be pretty thoroughly discredited, and premonitory stirrings on the Left have begun to appear. The weekly periodical *France-Observateur*, with an outlook quite similar to that of MR, has jumped in circulation from 100,000 to 130,000 in a few months—both the absolute figures and the rate of increase cannot but be astonishing to Americans—and there is reason to believe that the movement away from the traditional parties of the Left has been accelerated in the past two weeks. The classic question of reform or revolution seems to be taking on a new meaning for the French Left.

We wish we could report similar signs of change and life in the American Left. That we cannot may mean only that the American Left had already largely lost the capacity to report its own doings and feelings. Or it may mean that many people are still too stunned to know what they think of recent developments, let alone what they should do. Certainly nothing spectacular is to be expected. On the other hand, if this time of troubles turns out to have finally rid us of the problem of a Communist Party which had become a terrible millstone around the neck of any possible or potential radical movement, then at any rate we can look forward to the long and arduous task of reconstruction with at least a modicum of the hope and enthusiasm which have been so sadly lacking in left-wing circles these last eight years.

(November 12, 1956)

P. S. In the interval between writing and going to press, a great deal of new material on Hungary has appeared. It tends to prove that by November 4th the forces of extreme reaction were definitely getting the upper hand. Most impressive is Tito's speech of November 11th, from which the following are the key passages:

When Hungarian workers and progressive elements started their demonstrations . . . I am deeply convinced it was not possible to speak about any counter-revolutionary tendencies. It can be stated that it is sad and tragic that the reactionaries were able to find there a very fertile ground and gradually to move things into their channels. . . .

The question now is raised as to whether the Soviet intervention was necessary. The first intervention was not necessary. The first intervention, which took place at the request of Geroe, was absolutely wrong. . . .

Many people are asking why the [second] Soviet intervention took place. It is clear, we have said and we will always

MONTHLY REVIEW

say, that we are against the intervention and use of a foreign military force. Which is now the lesser evil: chaos, civil war, counter-revolution and a new world war; or the intervention of the Soviet troops that were there?

The former is a catastrophe and the latter an error. It is understood that if the latter saves socialism in Hungary, then, comrades, we will be able to say, although we are against the intervention, that Soviet intervention was necessary. (*New York Times*, November 17.)

There is no reason to doubt the accuracy of Tito's information, and his anguished ambivalence will be shared by everyone who tries to judge events in terms of their full consequences. For those who believe, or can manage to convince themselves, that there was no danger of fascism taking over in Hungary, there is of course no problem: the second Soviet intervention was the worst crime of all. But for those who feel obliged to accept Tito's interpretation of the Hungarian situation, there can be no easy escape from the dilemma which he poses.

Insofar as there is any escape at all, it will have to be found in future practice, not in past theorizing. How the Soviet Union is judged from now on will increasingly depend on its actions in Hungary. If the Russians get out of Hungary as soon as a reasonably stable government can be formed, they will be taking the first minimum step toward rehabilitating the socialist reputation of the USSR. In the meantime, it would be very wise of them to give the world a dramatic and convincing earnest of their good intentions. Why couldn't they, for example, ask the Poles and Yugoslavs to take over the task of maintaining order pending the re-assertion of the authority of the Hungarian government? Tito has expressed confidence in Kadar, a confidence which his past record would seem to support, and Hungarian workers and intellectuals could hardly suspect the Poles and Yugoslavs of acting as agents of Soviet domination. If, as the Soviet statement of October 30th said, the Soviet bloc is really going to develop into a "commonwealth of socialist nations," then surely the time to prove it is now.

RATES GO UP JANUARY 1, 1957

RENEW NOW AT THE PRESENT RATE

1 year	\$3.00
2 years	5.00
3 years	8.00

Add 50c per year for address outside the U.S.

JUSTICE DOUGLAS ON RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM

BY JOSHUA KUNITZ

In the summer of 1955, Justice Douglas, inveterate traveler and travel-writer, took a thirty-day trip through Soviet Central Asia, in the Turkmen, Tadjik, Uzbek, Kirgiz, and Kazakh Republics. He also visited a couple of cities in Siberia, as well as Moscow and Lenigrad in European Russia. Wherever the Justice went he found co-operation and courtesy—was dined and wined and showered with information. Having expected the worst, he was all the more pleasantly surprised. His parting words to the Soviet newsmen were warm and appreciative. Played up in the Soviet press, they stirred hopes that the Justice would be as warm and appreciative in his report to the American people.

Russian Journey (Doubleday, 1956) is Justice Douglas' report. It is not just another travel book. As the table of contents indicates, the range of topics explored is vast: The Soviet People; The Old and the New; The State and Free Enterprise; Soviet Agriculture; Soviet Industry; The Police, the Courts, and the Law; Music and the Theaters; Freedom of Expression; Church and State; Russia's Colonial Empire; The New Russian Strategy. Since most of the book, however, is based on direct observations in Central Asia, it is with the Central Asian part that I propose to deal, especially the chapter entitled "Russia's Colonial Empire."

This chapter attracted considerable attention both here and abroad when it first appeared in abridged form in the December 13, 1955, issue of *Look*, under the sensational half-page heading "Soviet Colonialism: Product of Terror." It was the initial installment of the report so hopefully looked for by the Soviets, but it was in no way calculated to please them. And the opening sentences of the article were, if possible, even more sensational than the heading:

The Soviets roundly denounce colonialism and pose as champions of the underprivileged. Yet within its own borders the U.S.S.R. today has a brand of colonialism similar to the kind the French practice in Morocco and more evil than anything England ever promoted.

I speak of Central Asia, where I spent a month last summer. In this part of the Soviet Union, political control is concen-

Joshua Kunitz was one of the first Westerners to report on Central Asia after the Russian Revolution. His book, Dawn Over Samarkand, was published in 1935.

trated in the hands of the Russians; there are segregated schools, special courts for trial of Russians, discrimination against the native people, a ruthless suppression of all nationalist sentiments and a quick liquidation of all those who dare breathe a word about liberty.

The rest of the article was in the same vein. Progress? Well, yes. "By material standards, Russia has done quite well by Central Asia": There has been a tremendous development of industry and agriculture; universal education has been introduced; medical care is "high on the priority list"; security in employment and old age has been established; the Central Asian woman has been emancipated "with a vengeance"—"not only from the Moslem veil, but also from her subservient place in society." But Russia has imposed all these improvements in furtherance of her own selfish imperialistic-colonial aims. She has provided the discipline and the material security which the native masses "sorely needed," but she has done it by fastening upon them a brutally harsh alien regime, a Moscow-directed government that denies the native peoples their right to self-determination, a dictatorial rule that is the very negation of the dignity of man, his freedom of conscience and expression, his right to worship as he chooses, his claim to due process—"rights that rank higher even than man's right to security."

The reader can imagine how the Soviets, who had just intensified their wooing of the colonial and semicolonial countries of Asia, Africa, and South America, reacted to such a report. Recalling the author's kindly remarks before he left the USSR, their press now denounced him as a hypocrite and liar. Simultaneously (February 1956), four Central Asian justices of the Supreme Court of the USSR dispatched a long missive to *Look*, charging their American colleague with "clear and deliberate" distortion of the truth, and requesting that the magazine publish their point-by-point rebuttal.

They denied all charges of segregation and discrimination.

They denied that the Central Asian Republics were not self-ruled or that they were not represented, as Justice Douglas asserted, on the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. "Each Union Republic," they wrote, "is . . . a sovereign state whose powers are limited only in such questions which, with the full consent of the Union Republic, are referred to the Union." Besides, "Mr. Douglas evidently does not know that the Uzbek S. Rashidov, the Turkmen A. Sarayev, the Tadjik N. Dodhudayev, the Kirghiz T. Katalov, and the Kazakh Kh. Pashenov are Vice-Presidents of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; neither does he say anything about the fact that 147 members of the nationalities of Central Asia have been elected deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and take direct

part in solving all state problems."

They denied that Central Asian culture was being Russianized. Invoking the testimony of Justice Douglas himself, citing his words about the excellence of Central Asian ballerinas and composers, they went on to list the names of the native heads of the several National Academies of Science in the Central Asian Republics, as well as to present some startling figures indicative of the colossal growth of native publishing. They exclaimed, "Do not all these attainments in the sphere of culture and art show that the Russians respect the national culture, traditions, and sentiments of the people?"

They denied any suggestion of Russian colonialism. Pointing to Central Asia's tremendous progress in industry, education, health, social legislation, and so on, which Justice Douglas had himself acknowledged, and adding spectacular data of their own, they asked, "Where, in what colonial country, could Mr. Douglas find such things?"

Such, in substance, was the Soviet rebuttal. *Look* declined to print it. Wrote William Attwood, the magazine's National Affairs Editor, on March 2, 1956:

After reading your letter, Justice Douglas informs us that in his opinion all the points which you raised were satisfactorily answered in his article. . . . In view of his reply and because of the space considerations we have decided not to publish a communication of this length in our Letters column.

Whereupon the *Moscow News*, an English language newspaper published in the USSR and circulated throughout the world, especially in Asia, printed on April 7th a full-page feature, displaying the Soviet Justices' letter, as well as a photostat of *Look*'s curt reply. It was obvious that in making this great splash, the paper felt that it was scoring a victory for Soviet propaganda. And it probably was, for the *Look* article, while sound on many points, was vulnerable on many others; and it certainly contained no answers, satisfactory or otherwise, to some important points raised in the Soviet letter.

The fact is that Justice Douglas, for all his experience, curiosity, discernment, and sympathy, was unable to transcend limitations of time, lack of familiarity with the languages and living patterns of the peoples he encountered, and his own personal and national biases and preferences. Inevitably, there were lapses in his report, some minor, some major—mistranslations, inaccurate transliterations, errors of fact and evaluation, overstatements, contradictions, questionable generalizations, slips into semantic pitfalls, and self-righteous polemics.

Thus, as other reviewers have noted, he definitely erred when he carried over the term *segregation*, a term that has acquired a spe-

cific meaning in the framework of American life and experience, into a social situation quite different from our own. He definitely erred in seeing discrimination in a long-established Soviet practice of offering extra pay, better living quarters, and bonuses to specialists who are asked to leave attractive homes and jobs and cities in order to work in remote and unfamiliar regions—a practice applied to Central Asians no less than to Russians. He exaggerated Russian ubiquity in Central Asia, having obviously mistaken every Russian-speaking non-native for a Russian—this, due to his unawareness that there were as many, or more, other Europeans in Central Asia—Jews, Ukrainians, Caucasians, Volga Germans, to name a few—as there were Russians, and to his inability to differentiate in their Russian speech the national nuances in accenting and phrasing, in pronunciation and intonation.

On the other hand, though overstated or misinterpreted, there were two truths the Justice did apprehend: (1) the potency of the Russian element in the life and culture of the Central Asian peoples; and (2) the lack of genuine self-rule in the Republics of the region. The Soviet justices unwittingly admitted the first in the very formulation of their denial. For even as they cited the cultural attainments of the Central Asian peoples as evidence of "Russian respect" for their native "cultures, traditions, and sentiments," they implicitly acknowledged the determining power of that respect—or rather *disrespect*. . . . I say *disrespect*, for surely if it be granted that the development of Central Asian arts, letters, sciences, and industry is a sign of *Russian respect*, then, by the same token, the weakening of the Islamic faith, the removal of the veil from the Moslem woman, the abandonment of the Arabic alphabet in favor of the Russian one, the compulsory study of Russian as a second language in all schools, the interference with trips by the faithful to Mecca, may all be taken, as Justice Douglas does indeed take them, as signs of Russian *disrespect* for native traditions and sentiments. As to the lack of self-rule, it has since been confirmed by the revelations made at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR and the consequent shift of many powers from the central government to the governments of the several Union Republics. Clearly, the Soviet Justices' denial of this point, while technically correct and effective in detail, was either naive or, more likely, disingenuous.

On the whole, one is struck by the low level of the presentations on both sides: errors of fact, overstatement, questionable proof, disingenuousness, naivete, and so on. But the basic flaw, on both sides, is superficiality. The Soviet spokesmen skim surfaces because they are inhibited from delving deeper into the complex problem of Russian influence, for fear that they may commit a deadly nationalist

deviation. The American reporter skims surfaces because he is scarcely conscious of any depths below. The first reduce everything to legal form and Russian respect; the latter reduces everything to Russian "imperialism" and "colonialism." Neither comes to grips with the basic facts of geography, history, revolution, cultural diffusion; neither mentions, let alone discusses, the relationship between the Russian, the European, and the strictly Marxian elements in Soviet civilization, or the ever-present contradiction between Communist internationalism and Russian "great power chauvinism," or the way this contradiction was aggravated under Stalin, or the course it is likely to take with the fading of Stalin's dictatorship and the crystallization of the new "collective leadership" line.

Justice Douglas in particular is both confused and confusing in his use of words. He fails to define his understanding of the term "colonialism." He makes no distinction between "national" and "nationalist," and uses interchangeably, as synonyms, the terms "Russian," "Soviet," "Communist," and "Marxist." He speaks of "Soviet Central Asia" and "Russian Central Asia," of "Soviet colonialism" and "Russian colonialism," he starts out speaking about "Russians" and then, imperceptibly, passes to words like "Communists" and "Marxists," as if they were all identical. At the same time, he persists in using the term "Russification" when in point of fact the phenomenon referred to might more accurately be described as "revolutionization," or "Sovietization," or, in most cases, as simple "modernization," "Westernization," or "Europeanization."

To remove the confusion, let us briefly reconstruct the background. A glance at the map will show that Central Asia, lying as it does at the very heart of the Asian continent, surrounded by impenetrable mountains, burning deserts, and endless plains, had only one possible avenue for contact with Western civilization—that was Russia. This contact was established rather painfully when, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Tsarist Russia came as an imperialist conqueror—not of course to bring civilization, but in the true spirit of classical colonialism to meet the Russian textile manufacturers' clamor for cheap cotton through exploiting the native population. In the wake of the army, came the other carriers of Western civilization—civil officials, merchants, bankers, railroad workers, craftsmen, professionals—Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, and others. Alongside of the old native cities (Tashkent, Bokhara, Samarkand) sprang up new, European (not *Russian*, even then the term was *European*) cities. And even then the reason for the separatism was not racial aloofness (racialism has never been a strong factor in Russian life) but cultural differences. The filthy old Asian cities were simply not designed to accommodate Europeans. Yes, and even

MONTHLY REVIEW

then there was no "segregation" as we understand it: any native, provided he could afford it, could live in the European section, send his child to a European (Russian) school, marry a European woman. Only an infinitesimal number, members of the wealthy class, availed themselves of the opportunity, thus forming the first cadres of an incipient westernized native intelligentsia. The masses, as in all colonial countries, were scarcely affected by this new influence. Yet prolonged proximity could not but have some westernizing impact.

The Revolution of 1905 stirred the peoples of Central Asia into abortive motion, while the two consecutive revolutions of 1917 hurled them into the epochal Bolshevik upheaval. Suddenly the tempo, the depth, the social character of the modernizing, westernizing process underwent a radical change. Instead of a few upper class individuals, generally flunkies of the Tsarist colonists, the masses, first urban then rural, were now drawn in, violently, explosively, and at a dizzy speed. This was no longer a mere matter of westernization, it was a matter of revolutionization. The masses were shown a vision of a better, more secure life, and a way of translating that vision into reality. And hosts of them accepted both vision and method.

The vision, it should be noted, was not a *Russian* creation. It originated in Western Europe, and was the culmination of a century of thought and struggle in the West. But it came to the Central Asians, as all other elements of European culture had, via Russia—in this case, as modified by a couple of generations of Russian socialists and Communists. To the subject peoples of Central Asia, the vision spelled liberation, national self-determination, the right to secession—the end of their colonial status; and, if they resolved to stay within the socialist family of nations, perfect equality with all the others in the family, including once dominant Russia. Internally, the vision spelled the end of exploitation and darkness, the end of class rule; it meant the rise of the masses, the workers and peasants, to the pinnacles of political and economic power.

The method? The method was that of insurrection and revolution and socialist construction. From a feudal existence, the masses in Central Asia as in the rest of the former Empire were summoned by the Revolution to execute a leap that would set them, in the briefest time, ahead of proud Europe, a mighty leap that would skip capitalism and land them straight in the socialist future. In short, they were summoned to effect national liberation, the bourgeois revolution, the industrial revolution, and the socialist revolution at one and the same time, and quickly.

The task of national liberation called for methods of utmost delicacy, for the urge to full independence in Central Asia was sufficiently strong to imperil the newly erected Soviet federation, indeed,

DOUGLAS ON RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM

the very Revolution itself. The Bolshevik solution was a masterpiece of dialectical sophistry: The Central Asians must be guaranteed the right to self-determination and secession, while the Communists among them must see to it that no separatist movements developed, by exposing the separatists as "bourgeois nationalists" and crushing them as "counter-revolutionists." In practice, since there were not enough native Communists to do the crushing, it was deemed permissible, in the name of revolutionary necessity, to bring in aid from the outside in the form of Red Army detachments. Owing to geographical proximity, as well as to the circumstance that the national composition of the Red Army was, like the total Soviet population, overwhelmingly Russian, the detachments, too, were overwhelmingly Russian. Thus, what the native Communists hailed as "comradely" Soviet aid, the native nationalists denounced as a mask for old-fashioned Russian imperialism and colonialism.

This clash of interpretations persisted with respect to the peaceful aid that began to be poured into Central Asia after the Soviets had finally been established there. The region, incomparably more backward than the European regions of the Soviet Union, had neither the economic nor human nor educational resources to accomplish the leap into socialism. It was in desperate need of outside help. This came from the other Soviet Republics. It was the Russians, the Ukrainians, and the others who were forced to draw in their belts more tightly than they would have needed to for their own national progress, and were taxed more heavily, so that the Uzbeks, the Tadjiks, and the rest might catch up and build the socialist structure alongside of them. It was they who were made to send in their administrators, organizers, engineers, agronomists, teachers, doctors, builders, and, of course, Communist Party bosses and security detachments. The ultimate aim was "autonomization," that is, the recruitment and development of native intellectual, professional, and party cadres capable of taking over the direction of all national and party affairs. But that required time. Meanwhile, still untrained natives, as a boost to national self-esteem, were given the conspicuous posts and glittering titles, whereas the less conspicuous, though key, positions were given to dedicated Communists from the European parts of the Union. And this, too, generated tensions. For the outsiders, especially the Russians, did not always behave like true Communist internationalists and not infrequently lapsed into the habitual attitudes of members of a dominant nation. Even non-Russians—many of them were Jews—occasionally behaved as instruments of Russian, rather than Soviet, power. This lent plausibility to the nationalist charges of Russian imperialism and colonialism.

Because of its greater backwardness, religious bigotry, and na-

MONTHLY REVIEW

tionalist zeal, Central Asia was more deeply shaken by the Revolution than other parts of the Soviet Union. Memories of the fears, the resistances, the passions, the terrors, and the brutalities of the Civil War days and of the great struggles of industrialization and collectivization were still vivid there in 1955, and Justice Douglas meticulously recorded them. He also recorded the faint echoes of nationalist resentments he overheard. What he failed to record was the much more vivid memories of the concomitant enthusiasms, exhilarations, and heroic sacrifices of those years. For those were there too, in abundance. Without them, the positive achievements of the Central Asian Revolution—and to one who like myself remembers Central Asia as it was 25 years ago, the achievements as described by Justice Douglas seem miraculous—could not have been attained. Even the degree of "autonomization" reflected in the Justice's report—the number of engineering, managerial, administrative, and scientific posts held by natives—seems miraculous to one who in 1931 saw only one native engineer in the whole of Central Asia! What passion for learning the Revolution released, for science, for modernity! Small wonder the vast majority of the natives are at present satisfied, as the Justice admits, to march "in step with the Russians, not pulling against them," while the old nationalist aspirations are being "mainly nurtured by the older people who, once having known the zeal of nationalism, keep it proudly alive in their heart."

Justice Douglas deprecates all the achievements in Central Asia as merely "material." But are they? Are Central Asia's spiritual values all in the past, in the Koran, the Mosque, and the horsehair veil? Are modern schools, academies, libraries, theaters, music, literature, even if Communistically oriented, purely material? Can people be exposed to the classical art and literature of the world without being spiritually and intellectually affected? Can any regime, however despotic, long expose men to such liberating forces yet keep their minds and souls indefinitely enchain'd? And even such "material" things as mechanization of industry and agriculture, security in work and old age, free medical treatment, and the like—can these be relegated to the realm of the purely material? Have not these in some measure added to the self-assurance, the dignity, the spiritual stature of the Central Asian individual? And are these not the very values Justice Douglas is most concerned with? One need only think of the liberation of the Central Asian woman—one half of the population—to recognize the enormous gains for human dignity.

True, the Central Asians do not at present enjoy many of the precious freedoms enjoyed in the West. But neither do the Russians, nor any of the other nationalities in the Soviet Union. Communism is a harsh system; and Communists, whether Russian or native, are

DOUGLAS ON RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM

hard task-masters. Yet there has been considerable progress even along these lines, especially since the death of Stalin. Rome was not built in a day. The Central Asians are just at the beginning of their advance—material, spiritual, intellectual. Along with being Bolshevized, they have been modernized, Westernized, Europeanized. Only in so far as all the new influences came via Russia, which naturally exerted specific Russian influences as well, does the charge of Russification, leveled by Justice Douglas, have any meaning.

Inevitably, in the process of cultural diffusion the flow has been from the richer and more advanced culture to the poorer and more backward, but—and this is the amazing thing—*already* Central Asian culture is beginning to exert some influence, as yet rather feeble, in the opposite direction. The flow is no longer one way. More and more Central Asian literary and dramatic works are appearing in the Russian and other Soviet languages. More and more Central Asian theatrical groups, choruses, orchestras, ballets, operas are being shown on the stages of Moscow, Kiev, Riga, and Tiflis. After long centuries of obscurity, Central Asian culture is beginning to make its way on the world stage. This cannot but strengthen it, inspire its creators, and add enormously to the sense of national dignity.

The Central Asian culture that is emerging comprises several distinct Central Asian cultures of which some seem to be more viable than others, but all of which have much in common with the cultures of the other Soviet peoples. Common experiences—Revolution, war, collectivization, industrialization, urbanization—have tended to produce common cultural patterns. Soviet life everywhere tends to find expression in a distinct Soviet culture. But the common content is embodied in various national forms. Thus modern Uzbek culture, like all other national cultures in the USSR, including Russian culture, is largely Soviet in content, but distinctly national, unmistakably Uzbek in form. It is the common Soviet content, it seems, that is behind Justice Douglas' charge of Russification. But the charge is erroneous. The Uzbeks will remain Uzbeks and their culture will remain a distinct Uzbek culture as long as the Uzbek people have their homelands, their mountains, their streams, their villages, their peasantry, and, above all, their language—the greatest repository of the nation's spiritual heritage, its wisdom, its imagery, its humors, its special way of seeing and responding to things. And the Uzbeks, as the other Central Asians, have not only preserved but enriched and developed their national language since the Revolution, through new schools, books, newspapers, periodicals, the theater, and, not least, through numerous translations from other languages. The truth is that never have national (not nationalist) aspirations soared so high in Central Asia as they do at present.

MONTALY REVIEW

In view of all this, one is inclined to demur at the assertion that "the USSR today has a brand of colonialism similar to the kind the French practice in Morocco and more evil than anything England ever promoted." One is even inclined to question whether the term colonialism, Soviet or Russian, applies to the situation as Justice Douglas himself presents it. In motivation and accomplishment, quantitatively and qualitatively, materially and spiritually, the progress in Central Asia presents such a contrast to what classical colonialism strove for and accomplished in centuries of rule in Asia and Africa that one cannot help wondering why the Justice insists on calling the two so strikingly different phenomena by the same name. Indeed the Justice himself, on thinking it over, seems to have been somewhat abashed at the glaring exaggeration, for in the book the sharp phrase "more evil than England ever promoted" has been quietly dropped, while a suggestion that, as of now, the vast majority of Central Asians find themselves in perfect accord with the Soviet regime has been, even if obliquely, introduced.

Space does not permit detailed comment on other aspects of *Russian Journey*. In general it can be said that the best written pages are those where the author records his immediate impressions of places and people; the most penetrating those that deal with the courts and the law; the most thought-provoking, those that discuss the Soviets' role on the international arena. The most important conclusion of the book, based on a conviction that "the Russian people want peace" and that "the Kremlin is anxious to avoid war," is that of the ineluctable necessity of peaceful coexistence and political settlement. This is expressed in various parts of the book, but nowhere more eloquently than in the Foreword:

Russia is a world so different from our own that comparisons are difficult. One who loses himself in the limitless expanses of Russia for some weeks comes out a different man. He need not like what he saw to have more understanding. If he gets only one lesson, it is this: that war can never settle the differences between the two nations—that Russia, like the United States, is too powerful, too vast, too far flung, ever to be conquered and garrisoned by a victorious army. A trip to Russia emphasizes the great differences and cleavages between the two peoples. But it teaches that the only settlement is a political one. The problem is, indeed, the great challenge of this, the last half of the twentieth century.

If we are to believe the public declarations of the Soviet leaders, the central point in Soviet policy is peaceful coexistence and all-round political settlement. On this Justice Douglas sees eye-to-eye with them. That is a great deal of agreement in this tense, snarling, atom-brandishing world of ours.

THE WORLD OF SCIENCE

by *Philip Morrison*

TWO NOTES ON THE MEANING OF FUSION

This month I propose to sketch two distinct, but related, topics. Each refers to a consequence of the fusion reaction, the enormous energy source of the hydrogen bomb. They are both to be taken, not as a catalogue of more or less important dicta of the experts, but as small essays on the nature of modern scientific evidence, efforts to display the reasonable, if sometimes subtle and unfamiliar, chain of logic and experience which lies behind the technological and scientific assertions of the day.

(I) The Factory Girls and the Fall-Out

The ominous shape of the H-bomb mushroomed distantly behind the election campaign of 1956. Stevenson brought to widespread attention the elements of the truth: that each big bomb explosion (if it uses uranium fission) spreads, first in the region around the test shot and eventually throughout the world, an important amount of radioactive substances. The rains carry these down to coat the ground, the leaves, the roofs, and streets of all the world. The radioactivity dies away in time, but for some substances, notably the isotope called strontium 90, the life expectancy is decades. Such isotopes may be taken up by plants, animals, man himself. They can then decay, releasing their rays within the bodies of a Filipino rice-grower, a Mexican cane-cutter, a Detroit machinist, or of their children. The grave question becomes a quantitative one: how much of such fall-out from atomic tests can be tolerated as a burden on the public health of the whole world? No one will be found to argue that the fall-out is good for man or for baby, let alone his ox or burro; but how bad it has become is legitimately uncertain. As a personal opinion, I would say flatly that harm is now being done to many individuals, but that the public health of mankind is still not seriously impaired. Tests at the same rate for a decade or two, or any wartime great explosions near the cities and fields of men, will end up close to or past the limit of prudent exposure of all mankind. But it is not just where the limit is to be set that this piece will discuss; rather it

Professor Morrison's articles on science appear in every other issue of MR.

MONTHLY REVIEW

is the nature of the evidence, the arguments which can lead to views which vary with the expert who announces them. Democrats found sincere and informed people expressing alarm, and Republicans found similar savants content if still somewhat qualified in their attitude. The issue is a serious one, and sure to become graver with time. But, equally, it is valuable to understand how views can differ, how unsure the matter is, and what faith in the order of nature is required to enable a firm expression of opinion about problems so vast and so new.

The basis for estimates of the danger of fall-out, especially the long-delayed danger of strontium 90, probably the most important of the complex set of possible fall-out constituents, is a story three decades long. It goes like this.

During the months of 1917, when America was experiencing her first spate of modern war production, a specialized industry experienced a sharp boom. It was the manufacture of self-luminous dial-painters, young girls in a clean factory, deftly marking figures, A factory in Orange, New Jersey, a leading firm in the trade, hired a couple of hundred young women, mostly teen-agers, to work at piece rates to paint over printed dial numbers with luminous compound. The work was not hard, and paid war wages to the girls of the Newark area who went to the plant. They sat at long benches, rapidly painting the numbers with small camel's-hair brushes, frequently drawing the brush tips between their lips to point them neatly. The turnover of these young girls was high; they were not steady workers. But a fraction of them worked at the job well and long. These regular dial painters, young girls in a clean factory, deftly marking figures, were to be counted among the dead and the wounded of World War I. Their casualty rate was higher than that of the AEF, for they died in the fifteen years after painting, victims of radioactive poisoning, the first ones studied by science and the very cases on which the estimates of fall-out danger today still rest.

The self-luminous paint glowed because within it energy released by radioactive decay caused the crystals of the paint to emit scintillations. From the early days of the Curies it had been known that radium and its nearly-allied radioactive substances had that property. When the war cut off United States import of Swiss and German products, the American dial-painting trade began. It flourished on war demand, and dwindled in the middle twenties under new competition from the Belgian radium producers. Not much radium or its equivalent is needed in the luminous paint. It takes only about one part of the radium salt to fifty thousand of the inert crystals to yield a bright glow. The radium cost at that time somewhere around a million dollars an ounce; but less than a dime's worth was to be found on each dial. This extraordinarily dilute material was yet a deadly and unsus-

pected poison.

By 1924, the plant had attracted unfavorable attention in its neighborhood because quite a few of the girls who had worked there were curiously ill with severe infections of the bones and jaw, infections which did not heal. The plant was felt to be emitting some poisonous fumes, and the Consumers' League of the Oranges asked the state to investigate. The state found nothing amiss. Then an industrial physician was asked by the League to see if the ailing girls had a case under the compensation laws. His study of the matter convinced him that the ill and dying girls had indeed been injured at their work, but the cause remained unclear. Finally, the pathologist Harrison Martland, chief medical examiner for Essex County, began a series of studies which remains classic in medical history.*

Martland established by actual measurement of the radioactivity of the bones of the dead girls and of the exhaled breath of the ill ones that the dial-painters had indeed ingested radioactive material as they pointed the brushes in their lips. Incurable anemias and destroyed bones of the jaw caused the first deaths, in girls heavily contaminated with the radium, within a few years after they had left the factory. Then for another fifteen years, dial-painters continued one by one to die, from terrible tumors of spine, thigh, or foot, tumors which crippled before they killed. A couple of dozen of the dial-painters have been studied to the point of death or severe disabling injury. Ten times as many former dial-painters have been seen; it turns out that one or two have died from as little radium as may be found in a single dial. Such an amount weighs much less than the ink in the dot over this letter *i*. Girls with as much radium as ink to print out a capital letter died in five years. There is no doubt that the retention of this small amount—a dime's worth at a million dollars an ounce—is fatally dangerous. Persons with such a body burden of radium might not all die, but they run a heavy actuarial risk.

How much is safe? A few veteran radium workers were found, and a few aviators who had been exposed to the dust from broken luminous instruments. These people had spent as much as twenty or thirty years of life carrying in their bodies—the activity here was measured from the exhaled breath—some radium, but were still free from clinical symptoms. None of these healthy radium-carriers had as much as half the amount found in the bones of the fatal case that had the lowest contamination. On this experience and

* The European dial-painters use a small rod, not a brush, and never touch it to the lips.

MONTHLY REVIEW

surely without any large factor of safety to cover errors of measurement, fluctuations in the deposition of the radium in various more or less sensitive points, personal variations in predisposition to blood-cell damage or to poor bone repair, the amount of radium which apparently can be taken into the bones of a human without any symptoms (in a few dozen cases at most), is set at one-tenth the minimum fatal dose, a weight of one-tenth microgram. Here is a realistic but by no means pessimistic estimate, coming from hard experience. There is to be sure some radium found naturally in all bone, varying with the kind of soil in the countryside of residence. This is about one one-hundredth of the fatal dose.

But radium is not strontium. The chain is longer still. Experimental animals, rat and patient rabbit, have been fed radium till death, and fed with smaller doses to establish a tolerable burden. The symptoms resemble those in men, and the whole matter of the distribution in the bone has been carefully studied. Then strontium too has been fed to rat and rabbit. The comparison between the effects of radium and strontium is made and they are found to resemble each other a good deal. In this way, a strontium equivalent to radium is found for rat and rabbit; and then the tolerance learned from the dial-painters and the pilots is translated into a tolerance of strontium.

Then the long chain of events is followed. From fall-out to soil and plant, from leaf to cattle feed, from feed to milk and cheese, from nourishment to bone, the measurements run. Some strontium is found already in the skeletons of children in the United States. It appears to be much less than the tolerable burden which we think we know, inferred from a chain of tests which runs from man to rat, from strontium to radium, back to the aching doomed young women twenty-odd years ago in the Oranges, limping into Martland's office, to watch him check off on his long list of wartime dial-painters their own names.

How secure is this chain of inferences, how much people, soils, fodder, animals, vary, how often chance will concentrate a little speck of radio-strontium in the growing end of the thigh-bone of a boy in Binghamton or Singapore: all this will be known by the end of the sixties, when we will have seen, or much better and more likely, not seen, an epidemic of crippling and killing tumors of the bone. Very probably we are still safe actuarially; such is the orderliness of the natural world. But there is plenty of room for reasonable doubt.

There is still time; strontium in the soil of the whole world, between the latitudes of Australia and those of North Europe, still remains well below the Martland-derived limit, but it grows with each American, Soviet, or British test. The time must come when the powers will tacitly or explicitly limit their fission-fusion testing;

better soon than late. On the other side, it is plain that the danger from tests is there, real, growing, but not desperate. But major fission-fusion war could raise the strontium level everywhere by hundredfolds, and the dial-painters' disease would become a generation's plague on the whole world, on the just and the unjust alike, on the neutral and the belligerent, on the victor and the vanquished.

The tests ought in the end to be limited; and the war must be avoided.

(2) The Perpetual Lamp

It is by now a commonplace that the controlled fusion reaction, the hydrogen bomb tamed, is a potential source of economic and peaceful power on an unprecedented scale. A good many people, hearing this said for the uranium chain reaction, and now re-said with even more glowing and remote prophesy for the fusion or hydrogen reaction, must have wondered at the apparent profligacy of nuclear physics in the disposal of its energies, and retired into incomprehension. But the existence of two, and of only two, clear paths to winning of nuclear power is a consequence of the most fundamental analysis of the physical situation, a consequence fully evident to anyone who will consider the matter a very little time. That the reader can easily comprehend the details of the still-undesigned devices which will win hydrogen fusion power is false; no one can do that yet. But the deepest basis for the physicist's knowing from the very first, twenty years and more ago, that two paths to energy might be possible, is easy to grasp, and illuminates the nature of at least the qualitative predictions of modern science.

First, it is necessary only to recall the day one first played with the toy horseshoe magnet, with its red-painted U and its bright ends. (If any reader has never done that, or has forgotten the experience he will find no investment of time or money which will bring him to the fundamental forces of the natural world, to the heart of natural philosophy, more surely than half an hour with the ten-cent toy!) Two magnets are needed, of any sort. Then will be felt in every sense that likes repel and unlikes attract. A given pair of magnet poles need considerable force to push them together; the other pair cannot be held apart without real effort. As with magnets on a human scale, so it is in the microcosm. The forces which maintain the structure of the nuclear heart of matter are dual. The repulsive and the attractive forces are balanced in every stable system. A logical model for a nucleus, a model which is indeed not pictorially like the nucleus but which carries its full logical simplicity, might be made out of a rubber band holding together two mutually repelling magnetic poles. A similar model, which contains the dual elements, but differently arranged, could be made of two attracting poles, held apart by an

MONTHLY REVIEW

interposed elastic block of rubber. Equilibrium is in both cases maintained. But in each case it could be upset with differing results. The snapping of the band would allow the repelling poles to fly apart, releasing energy as they do so. The failure of the interposed sheet would allow the snapping together of the two attracting poles, again with the release of the stored energy into motion.

It is the same with nuclei, the hearts of atoms. Their structure is maintained by a balance between repelling and attracting forces (not magnetic at all in character, but the repulsive force electrical, and the attractive one specifically nuclear, *sui generis*, without large-scale analogue.) A nucleus will be of one type or the other: for heavy nuclei, any small disturbance may expand the nucleus a little, allow the dominance of the repulsive forces, and the once-stable nuclear matter flies apart. This is nuclear fission, and occurs for the heaviest elements, like uranium, most easily. For the lightest elements, contrariwise. Here, two nuclei may approach each other. If they come close enough, the attractive forces between them overbalance the repulsive ones, and they fly together. This is fusion. The heaviest elements indeed tend to cleave into lighter ones, with more stability; the lightest ones tend rather to fuse by pairs again into more stable nuclei, now heavier than they. Both ends of the list of elements, heavy and light, tend to become like the nuclei of the middle range, those resembling iron, which are the most stable. Thus there arise the two means of nuclear energy release: fusion and fission. There are no more. This duality is fixed by the nature of forces: there are those which push apart two similar entities, and there are those which pull together. The same equilibrium is struck at all levels, though with different types of forces and different strengths of forces. But this deep duality pervades physics.

Fusion requires the approach of the two nuclei, say of hydrogen; fission requires the disturbance of a heavy, barely stable nucleus, say of uranium. It is hydrogen fusion which feeds the great five-billion year old furnace which is the sun: It is fusion which promises to make energy for economic purposes—heat, power, transport, processing—as free from raw material limitations as the sunlight itself. For the most promising of all raw materials for fusion is the uncommon nucleus of hydrogen, the so-called heavy hydrogen. It occurs as only one among six thousand atoms of hydrogen in natural water, what we learned to call H_2O . This small amount means that every source of water on the earth—rainfall, stream, lake, the sea itself—is a source of fuel richer in energy, gallon for gallon, by three hundred times than the black Arabian crude oil. Every country has access to sea or stream; the water volume far exceeds that of the richest oil reserves dreamed of by the men of Aramco or Shell. The present

THE WORLD OF SCIENCE

water supply to New York can bring enough water to fuel all the present energy uses of the whole city for a year in the space of two hours. Nor is the water consumed; all but a spoonful out of every barrel would be returned to the source. And the sea itself is as good as the best mountain water for nuclear fuel.

It seems plain that the fuel supply represented by the potential use of fusion is inexhaustible in human terms. Its cost is all but zero. This by no means implies that the power it produces would be free, or easy to win; doubtless installations of great complexity and capital cost will be required to win it. And perhaps we will never learn how. But it seems more likely that the next decades will see the introduction of a practical scheme, and the century's turn, perhaps, its widespread use. The likelihood of such a success, coupled with the steadily increasing power of the chemical industry to produce new materials of all sorts from widespread resources (synthetic fibers from coal and air, light metals from clays or sea-water) suggests that the resource problems of economics will slowly tend to disappear. Power and materials will be available everywhere to societies with the human labor and technical skill needed to make use of them. Only agricultural land need remain a key pressure against human society; it is still unclear how far the availability of energy in large amounts, and of new materials and processes, can go to reduce the need for space by food crops.

What effect such evening-out of resources will have on the uneven development of economic societies remains to be considered; in a certain sense, technical and organizational skills replace natural wealth. Skills are in general more easily acquired than are mines by a nation which temporarily lacks them. Moreover, the reduced importance of rational use of resources implies some relative stimulus for an economic system like capitalism, under which the waste of resources is inevitable but the drive for increased capital use and technical change can remain strong.* There remains not much doubt that the history of the next generations will be strongly shaped by the eventual success or failure of the projects now under way in Britain, the Soviet, the United States, Japan, and even smaller countries, seeking a means of lighting the perpetual lamp, of obtaining controlled energy release from the fusion of heavy hydrogen.

* A serious remark, which I owe to a half-jocular colleague!

It has been truly said that as our strength approaches infinity, our security approaches zero. The H-Bomb gives us, not power to secure ourselves, but only the power to destroy the world.

—American Friends Service Committee, *Speak Truth To Power.*

CHINA'S GREAT ROAD

BY ARTHUR K. DAVIS

The key historical event of our time is surely the Chinese Revolution. A generation ago an equally epoch-making upheaval in Russia committed that nation to the building of a socialist society. Not only did the Chinese Communist victory in 1949 set a second great nation on the road toward socialism; it also marked the shifting of the balance of world power in favor of the socialist bloc, and it threw into high gear the rollback of Western imperialism from Asia. For the half-billion people of China the Revolution signifies two things: the recovery of their political independence after a century of foreign domination, and the eventual transformation of their pre-industrial, semi-feudal society into a socialist industrial order.

Like all such processes, the Chinese Revolution has deep historical roots. The Feudal Bureaucratic Empire, having spanned two millennia, finally collapsed, for all practical purposes, in the mid-19th century. Though it nominally survived another half century, its effective demise was marked by the Taiping Revolution (1849-1865), modern China's first great reform effort, defeated only by armed Western intervention. For nearly a century, rival foreign imperialisms exploited China, operating first through the fossilized Manchu empire, then through various warlord regimes, and occasionally resorting to direct military action.

Through this maze of foreign intrigue and domestic factionalism runs the red thread of the several Chinese resistance movements, at first ineffective and easily frustrated by Chinese and foreign vested interests—as in the Boxer uprisings of 1900, the Sun Yat-sen republicanism of the 1910s and 1920s, and the abortive Communist revolts of the later 1920s—but slowly maturing into one of those decisive and massive processes that mark the end of one social era and the beginning of another. Where Franco-British intervention against the Taipings succeeded in the 1860s, American intervention against the Chinese Communists failed in the 1940s. "Never again will China be an insulted nation," said Mao Tse-tung. "We have stood up!"

This panorama, outlined here so sketchily, comes alive in the late Agnes Smedley's book, *The Great Road: the Life and Times of*

The author, a professor of sociology at an eastern university, is a regular contributor to MR. His most recent article was "Juvenile Delinquency under Capitalism and Socialism" in the September issue.

Chu Teh (Monthly Review Press, 1956).* Here in all its vividness is the colorful life of Red China's military leader—the only full-length biography in English to date. At the same time it is a brilliant historical analysis. In the sense that its wealth of living detail clarifies instead of obscuring the basic social forces of latter-day China, the work is a classic—a great book about a great subject.

Too often have books about China written by our academic historians and sociologists presented a distorted picture of the Chinese Revolution. (Indeed, the few American scholars who, like Owen Lattimore, have analyzed China with insight and integrity have sometimes met with government persecution.) But Agnes Smedley, who never finished grade school, has left us a book with more value than a dozen such "expert" treatises.

The book covers, though not without gaps, the period from Chu Teh's birth in 1886 to the end of 1946. Miss Smedley gathered her material from conversations with Chu Teh in 1937, from his papers, and from her years of newspaper work in China. Her book is neither a critical evaluation nor an official apologetic. Its heart is the 1937 recollections of Chu Teh presented against the background of his times. More definitive accounts of Chu Teh and the Revolution will be written, but *The Great Road* will remain both a prime source document and a classic panorama of changing China.

The book is not only a general view of a critically important historical era—an era that will some day be recognized as one of the great watersheds of history, like the French and Russian Revolutions. It also contains material relevant to many special fields of study. Historians, political scientists, sociologists, diplomats (especially American diplomats), soldiers, and psychologists will find *The Great Road* well worth reading, however they may disagree with its author's particular slant on her material. Among the special problems to which Agnes Smedley's book can contribute are: the social origins of revolutionary leaders, conditions among the Szechwan peasants and artisans around the turn of the century, Chinese warlord patterns, the nature and tactics of the Sun Yat-sen movement, culture and personality, the psychology of social movements, the role of Russian advisers in the Chinese Revolution, sources of anti-foreign attitudes among the Chinese people, the growth of nationalism in modern China, and the causes of social revolutions.

Chu Teh, commander-in-chief of China's Red Army, was born in a poor peasant family in Szechwan Province, western China. That

* Until January 1, 1957, *The Great Road* plus a year's subscription to MR is \$7.00—ED.

MONTHLY REVIEW

his family was not in the poorest level of the peasantry only heightens the impact of the following picture:

I grew up hungry, so that later, in the revolutionary movement, it did not bother me so much as if I had never known it. It was the same with work. I grew up working so that, later, I never felt that I lost face when I did physical labor. It was the same with walking: after I reached manhood I sometimes had a horse to ride, but I have walked most of my life, and long distances, months and years at a time, side by side with the soldiers I commanded. After our revolution is victorious we will develop our country and our people will have enough to eat and wear, and they will ride in trains and motor cars, and have time and energy to develop themselves culturally. (P. 16.)

Like most peasants, Chu Teh's elders attributed their submarginal existence to supernatural forces and bad luck. But the wandering artisans from the towns spread a different view. "They said we were poor not because of our bad fate but because the gentry and the nobles lived luxurious lives and unloaded all taxes on the people . . . [They] sometimes mentioned the British opium and other foreign wars which had destroyed Chinese sovereignty. . . . And now machine-made foreign goods entered China virtually duty-free so that they were destroying Chinese goods and the livelihood of the artisans." (P. 22.)

One of the itinerant weavers who visited the Chu farm each winter was a former Taiping soldier. Tales of the Taiping Revolution circulated among the peasants, nurturing many a future revolutionary leader. "When the People's Liberation Army marched triumphantly into Peking eighty-five years after the Taiping Revolution went down to defeat, its captured American tanks and fieldpieces were emblazoned with its eight military disciplines, some of which were lifted bodily from the disciplines of the great Taiping army. This new army was taught that the Taipings had started China's bourgeois democratic revolution and that it was its own historic task to complete what the Taipings had begun." (Pp. 29-30.)

At the age of six, Chu Teh and two older brothers were admitted to a nearby private school kept for landlords' sons. "In my childhood, conditions had become so bad that education was a life necessity for the peasants. A whole clan would pool its resources to educate one son who could talk back to the tax collectors and soldiers, and keep accounts." (P. 36.)

School life did not run smoothly for the newcomers. "To the sixteen boys in the school, the spectacle of peasant children going to school seemed as ridiculous as if three water buffaloes had entered the schoolroom to study the classics." (P. 37.) So the young Chus were promptly nicknamed the "three buffaloes."

An important influence on the youthful Chu Teh must have been his third teacher, with whom he lived and studied about a decade. This was the elderly Hsi Ping-an, a man without a degree, who "loved teaching, was courageous and enlightened and possessed a sardonic sense of humor that led him to strip ancient and modern heroes of their false trappings." (P. 45.) In studying the history of China's revolutionary century, let us not forget the humble artisans and the Hsi Ping-ans.

While still in school, Chu Teh heard about the Boxer uprising of 1900. Of this, Miss Smedley writes:

The news [of the sack of Peking by foreign troops and civilians] almost paralyzed our school for days. . . . The final reckoning showed that some two hundred foreigners and a few thousand [Chinese Christian] converts had been killed in the uprising. The number of Chinese killed were a hundredfold greater, but the foreigners never mentioned that, for a Chinese life was cheaper than grass. When we heard the peace terms we were unable to speak. . . . When I studied in Germany in later years, I was sometimes a guest in homes where I saw Chinese rugs, vases, paintings, carved furniture, or other art treasures. When I asked about them, my hosts became embarrassed and I knew they were loot from the homes and palaces of Peking. (Pp. 55, 58.)

After a year at the Higher Normal College in Chengtu, Chu Teh in 1908 became a physical education instructor in one of the first modernized schools in his native district. For nearly a year the little staff of this school, supported by a few progressive merchant families, fought off the hostility of feudal-minded people, shocked by the idea of studying gymnastics and modern science. The attacks took the form of malicious gossip, legal harassment, and street assaults on students and teachers by hired thugs. Such struggles, said General Chu, were common throughout China. "They gave him knowledge of feudal forces in action, and also self-confidence in active struggle." (P. 80.)

Despite the bitter opposition of his family, Chu Teh determined on a military career. "To become a teacher of such an outrageous subject as physical training was one thing, but to join the scum of the earth was more than they could take. . . . He left his home, an outcast. . . . 'Yet I had chosen my road and I could not turn back.'" (Pp. 80-81.) The year 1909 saw him enrolled in the Yunnan Military Academy, where he promptly joined the secret republican movement of Sun Yat-sen. He participated as a junior officer in the overthrow of the defunct Manchu dynasty in Yunnan and Szechwan Provinces in 1911-1912.

MONTHLY REVIEW

During the next few years, Chu was drawn into the warlord pattern which soon engulfed the new republic. Now a general himself, Chu Teh became an opium smoker and tasted the pleasures and dangers of military power. Yet some part of him remained the seeker. After many adventures, and after breaking his opium habit, he turned up in 1922 in Shanghai. He was attracted to the newly formed Communist movement by its uncompromising anti-foreignism, but his first application for membership was refused. Then followed four years of study in Germany, where he met Chou En-lai, joined the Berlin branch of the Chinese Communist Party, studied Marxism, and did organizational work for the Kuomintang—at that time still a liberal party.

In 1926, Chu Teh's road led him back to China to play a minor role in the renewed revolutionary upheavals which united much of the country under Kuomintang rule. How that bourgeois nationalist movement, led by Chiang Kai-shek in uneasy alliance with the Communist Party, split when the peasants spontaneously rose against the landlords; how the business and landowner classes, with foreign aid, slaughtered the workers and peasants—all this Agnes Smedley describes through the eyes of Chu Teh.

The left-wing leaders and their Russian advisers get some hard knocks in *The Great Road*. "Instead of turning to the workers and peasants for support against the counter-revolution," said General Chu, "left-wing politicians and militarists began suppressing the mass movement. . . . By mid-July 1927, the Great Revolution was finished. Leftist revolutionaries, followed by Russian advisers, were in flight, rivers of blood were flowing, generals were changing sides, and there was chaos and confusion everywhere. Chiang Kai-shek was rising to power . . . propped up by the combined forces of foreign imperialism, the Chinese bourgeoisie, and the feudal landed gentry." (Pp. 193-194.) And also by the errors of his enemies, let us add.

Now began a new phase as the remnants of the Left, with Mao and Chu coming to the fore, turned away from the Russian-formulated dogma of a city-oriented proletarian revolution, and toward a peasant-based movement nurtured in the countryside. But how haltingly this policy emerged! As late as 1930, suicidal Communist attacks were undertaken against heavily armed big cities under the guns of foreign warships. Though he captured Changsha, Chu was quickly driven out by a bloody four-day shelling from a foreign fleet, led by an American gunboat. Blaming this abortive campaign, which was premised on the presumed imminence of a nationwide proletarian revolt, on Li Li-san's "adventurism" is not especially convincing, nor is the hindsight skepticism of Chu and Mao (pp. 275-279). This affair reminded me of official Russian

scapegoating, first against Trotsky, later against Stalin.

Since Miss Smedley's unfinished manuscript omits the 1931-1934 period, there is no mention of the important part played by Communist errors in their expulsion from their South China Soviets. The narrative jumps at once to the famous Long March of 1935-1936—that incredible 8000-mile struggle of the Red Army to new bases in the northwest. There the Communists soon recaptured the initiative, and ultimately won supreme power, by practising revolutionary domestic reforms and by seizing the leadership of the national struggle against Japan. On both of these fronts the Chiang regime glaringly defaulted.

It is customary to portray victorious campaigns and enterprises as brilliantly planned and executed feats. Certainly that is one side of such matters. My own worm's-eye view of World War II has led me to believe that there is also another side—that wars are won because the other fellow's blunders are greater than your own. Evidently this principle can apply to civil wars, too. Miss Smedley did not pay enough attention to it.

Criticism of the details of *The Great Road* must be left to others, although one interesting item seems worth mentioning here. General Chu comments (p. 33) upon the remarkable insights of Karl Marx concerning the Taiping Revolution. Now Marx's original statements actually referred to other popular Chinese outbreaks in the 1850s, not to the Taipings, who were explicitly excluded from his remarks. Marx produced some brilliant newspaper articles on India, and some good ones on China. But to my knowledge the only paper he ever wrote on the Taipings was a second-rate pot-boiler which merely parroted official British propaganda against the Taipings (*Vienna Presse*, July 7, 1862). In a sense, however, this minor error by Chu Teh enhances the value of Miss Smedley's book as a source document, for it illustrates in a small way how the halos of prophetic leaders are sometimes brightened.

The last eighth of *The Great Road* sketchily covers World War II and the civil war through 1946. Written abroad, it lacks the indescribable color and life of the preceding chapters. The author was unable to return to China and finish her work before her death in England in 1950. Even so, that concluding fragment is a far more valid version of recent Far Eastern history than most of the views now prevailing in official American circles. The story of how Chiang's foreign-linked capitalist and landlord coalition spent the 1940s stalling on the Japanese war and on long overdue domestic reforms and how it devoted its main efforts to sabotaging—increasingly with American aid—the Communist-led, anti-Japanese peasant revolution is briefly told in the final section. We will not dwell on

MONTHLY REVIEW

it, for it is not central to Agnes Smedley's work. But who can forget the book's closing scene as the civil war is finally renewed and the Communists evacuate their Yenan capital?

Two weeks after his sixtieth birthday, General Chu was again tramping the roads and paths of China. Chiang Kai-shek's blockading army was converging on Yenan. . . . To the farmers who came out with blanched faces to bid him farewell, General Chu said: "We will not be gone long!" To Mao Tsetung, now fifty-three, who walked by his side, General Chu said: "I have lived sixty years. From now on, every year of my life is just so much gain!" So he went forward on the great road of human liberation, this time to lead his country and people to the victory which three years later shook Chiang Kai-shek and set the reactionaries of the world a-tremble." (P. 444.)

MR ASSOCIATES announces
Six Lectures on AMERICAN CAPITALISM
by PAUL M. SWEENEY

Tuesdays: JAN. 15 FEB. 12 MAR. 12 8:30 P.M.

Thursdays: JAN. 17 FEB. 14 MAR. 14 8:30 P.M.

Place: HOTEL CLARIDGE, Broadway and 44th St., N.Y.C.

Admission: In Advance \$8 for the series, Students \$5
At door—Single tickets \$1.50—Associates free

Send NOW for tickets to MR Associates, 66 Barrow St., N.Y.C.

NOW AVAILABLE
MONTHLY REVIEW's two latest pamphlets

No. 12—WHAT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT SUEZ
by Paul M. Sweezy and Leo Huberman

No. 13—MARXIAN SOCIALISM and
POWER ELITE OR RULING CLASS?
both by Paul M. Sweezy

Single copies 25c 5 copies for \$1.00 30 copies for \$5.00
All prices include postage. Send your order, with payment enclosed to

MONTHLY REVIEW, 66 Barrow Street, New York 14, N. Y.

WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

Invasion

Four fears underlie the policy which Britain and France have been following in the Middle East: (1) Curtailment of the Middle East supplies of relatively cheap oil now going to Western Europe. (2) Arab nationalism funneled through and led by an ambitious, popular rabble-rouser. (3) Loss by the Western powers of their colonies, their natural resources, and their markets in North Africa and Near Asia. (4) The possibility that the Soviet Union or the United States will link a part or all of the Middle East to the planet-girdling chain of its prestige, influence, and power.

Under pressure of these four fears, during the last few hours of October, 1956, combined British-French air-sea-land forces moved from prepared positions in Cyprus and Malta, bombed Egyptian air fields and cities, attacked Egyptian vessels in Egyptian waters, landed military units which sought to occupy the Suez Canal strip and its approaches. These aggressive moves constitute an invasion by one sovereign state of a neighbor state.

The British-French invasion of Egypt was preceded by a twelve-hour ultimatum: if Cairo would permit London and Paris to occupy militarily the Suez Zone without using force, there would be no bloodshed, but only the ignominious surrender of Egyptian sovereignty.

Behind the ultimatum lay weeks and months of preparation and mobilization. The French government was in favor of military intervention even before the nationalization of the Canal, because of the aid which the Nasser Government is alleged to have extended to Algerians fighting for independence from France. From the early days of Suez nationalization, Prime Minister Eden attacked President Nasser personally, and called for an end to his dictatorship, by force if necessary.

Perhaps coincidentally, perhaps as a result of prearrangement, the armed forces of Israel invaded Egypt on October 27, 1956, and drove toward the Suez Canal strip.

The British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt led to quick action in the United Nations. (1) A resolution in the Security Council, sponsored by Washington and Moscow, calling for a cease-fire, was vetoed by Britain and France. (2) A resolution to convene the Gen-

MONTHLY REVIEW

eral Assembly in special session was carried in the Security Council, with only Britain and France voting in the negative. (3) The General Assembly meeting on November 1-2, by a vote of 64 to 5, called for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of foreign armed forces from Egyptian territory. The Assembly session on November 3-4 repeated and re-emphasized the demand for a cease-fire and withdrawal of military forces from Egypt.

The Western alliance split wide open over the issue of armed intervention in Egypt, after the Suez nationalization in July, 1956. The French-British demand for armed intervention was countered by United States insistence on moderation. The French-British program of military action was met by the United States plan of a Canal Users Association. The French-British insistence upon economic sanctions and use of the Canal without payment of toll to the Egyptian Government was answered by proposals that a United States syndicate or an international consortium finance Suez Canal improvement and make itself responsible for the technical operation of the Canal. At this point, diplomatic communications between London-Paris and Washington virtually ceased. The British and French, in close collaboration, continued their military preparations. Israel moved armed forces toward the Suez Canal, Britain and France delivered an ultimatum which Egypt rejected. On October 30, President Eisenhower made a personal appeal to the British and French prime ministers to abandon their plans for a military invasion of Egypt. The next day, after the invasion had begun, the President described it as an error in policy which could not be reconciled with the United Nations Charter.

While the Suez issue developed a degree of unity in France, it divided Britain into bitterly hostile camps and disorganized the Conservative cabinet. The conflict over Suez, coupled with the revolt in Hungary, made Washington and New Delhi the leaders of a United Nations drive to implement the Charter and restore peace.

Not since the summer of 1950, when the war began in Korea, had the United Nations faced graver choices. The major powers were sharply divided; Britain-France on one side; the United States and the Soviet Union on the other. Could the United Nations organization stand the strain of this invasion of a UN member state by three other members? Could it survive a head-on collision of four permanent Security Council members? Or would it be disrupted and perhaps destroyed by the struggle to control and possess the Suez Canal?

Hope and Anticipation

Former Hungarians, landlords, dispossessed businessmen, and

jobless professionals excluded from their homelands by the revolution of the 1940s are buoyed up by hope and are living in the seventh heaven of anticipation. "At last the collapse has come—at long last!"

These political refugees from Eastern Europe remind us of the White Russians we met in Harbin and other parts of North China in 1927—ten years after the Bolsheviks had taken over the government of Russia. Former Russian aristocrats, landlords, and generals likewise were buoyed up by hope, and were living in hectic anticipation of the time when they should return to claim their lost privileges, sinecures, and sources of unearned income. One of the younger men, growing confidential, said to us: "If I were permitted to do so, I could name The Day which has been set for our return to the motherland!"

Hungarian white guardists, exiled for a decade from their motherland, have been biding their time, impatiently, in Britain, Holland, France, Germany. In October, 1956, they were joining the rebels to fight for the restoration of their property, prestige, and power. For them, at long last The Day had come.

The *New York Times* of October 28, 1956, pictured the tribulations of the "Hungarian heroes who died for freedom." The same paper reported a speech, delivered to the World Affairs Council in Dallas, Texas, on October 27. "The spirit of patriotism," said Mr. Dulles, "and the longing of individuals for freedom of thought and of conscience and the right to mold their own lives, are forces which erode and finally break the iron bonds of servitude. Today we see dramatic evidence of this truth. The Polish people now loosen the Soviet grip upon the land they love. And the heroic people of Hungary challenge the murderous fire of Red Army tanks. These patriots value liberty more than life itself. And all who peacefully enjoy liberty have a solemn duty to see, by all truly helpful means, that those who now die for freedom will not have died in vain."

"The captive peoples," Secretary Dulles continued, "should never have reason to doubt that they have in us a sincere and dedicated friend who shares their aspirations. They must know that they can draw on our abundance to tide themselves over the period of economic adjustment which is inevitable as they rededicate their productive efforts to the service of their own people, rather than of exploiting masters."

Polish and Hungarian refugees, together with their backers in London, Paris, and Washington assume that the attempt to build socialism is a passing phase which will speedily be terminated and replaced by a restored capitalist-feudal pattern of economy and society. Secretary Dulles described this attitude when he stated that

MONTHLY REVIEW

we should look upon socialist construction as "impermanent rather than permanent."

Our assumption is that the culture pattern of the West has turned a corner—turned it as a result of developments in technology and the advent of the power age, and in the theory and practices of socialist construction. If our position is historically and theoretically sound, there is no more likelihood that Eastern Europe will return to capitalism than that Western Europe will return to feudalism. There may be temporary pauses in social progression, and catastrophes may supervene, but the clock of history cannot be turned back.

Rebellion in Hungary

Rebellion in Hungary arose from several causes, such as the drive of the old ruling class elements to regain power; the inertia of a population steeped in the traditions of serfdom and wagery; nationalism and sectarianism; the presence of armies of occupation; the impatience, especially of the younger generation, to recover quickly from war losses. Perhaps this listing of the causes of rebellion should be headed by the hectic tempo at which the transition has been made from a war-torn bourgeois society to planned socialist construction. The pace was too rapid.

Likewise, the Communists in Hungary violated certain axioms of political science and sociology: (1) They ignored the fact that every totality is composed of semi-autonomous parts. Under the plea of monolithism they overcentralized and made no provision for local autonomy or normal deviation and opposition. (2) They overlooked the fact that the people are not merely the communities over which governments rule, but are a component part of those governments. (3) As the movement for socialist construction spread from country to country, the Communist leadership failed to build an international structure corresponding to the new international relations established among the peoples republics. While overstressing centralism in the control of each socialist nation, they underemphasized the need for international bonds between the nations building socialism.

The Challenge to Western Europe

Arnold Toynbee's book *The World and the West* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1953) surveyed western history from a planet-wide vantage ground. In an article on "The Challenge to Western Europe" (*New York Times*, September 30, 1956), Toynbee continues his efforts to view the West in historical perspective.

Speaking geographically, Professor Toynbee notes that Western Europe is "the tip of one of the peninsulas of the continent of Asia;

and Asia is the only genuine continent there is. Europe and Africa . . . are just headlands jutting out from the continent, like Arabia and India; and the European peninsula has not even the advantage that Arabia and India both enjoy, of occupying a central position."

Speaking temporally, the West is a late-comer. Civilization made its appearance in the Tigris-Euphrates basin five thousand years ago. It reached the Mediterranean coast of Western Europe little more than two thousand years ago. Until the 15th century, Western Europe was "a dead end whose inhabitants had their backs to an ocean which they could not cross. Like Patagonia and Australia in the same period of human history, Western Europe was an asylum for weak and unsuccessful peoples who had been pushed out of the heart of the habitable world by stronger and more competent neighbors."

Through their development of ocean-going sailing ships, coupled with the rapidly expanded use of power tools and power weapons, Western Europeans secured a cultural lead which enabled them to "Europeanize" the planet and reduce its peoples to the status of colonials (second-class citizens).

European world domination, based on superiority in tools and weapons, was highly unstable. No sooner had the colonial peoples learned how to use western techniques than the planet-wide empires held by the Western European people melted away "like snow in springtime." The resulting power shifts have concentrated world power in North America and Asia, leaving Western Europe "North America's bridgehead on the great Asian continent." This power shift has transformed Western Europe from a primary world power center into "one of the world's principal universities, museums, pilgrimage resorts, and playgrounds."

Professor Toynbee concludes his analysis by pointing out that if the peoples of Western Europe wish to deal with North America and Russia "on equal terms" they must unite into "a single body politic."

This analysis of the changing world position of Western Europe is not new, nor is it original with Toynbee. Fritz Sternberg described it in *The Coming Crisis* (1947). Barbara Ward in *The West at Bay* popularized the same theme in 1948. It was developed in great detail by R. P. Dutt in *The Crisis of Britain* (1953), and summarized by Toynbee in a chapter on "The Dwarfing of Europe" in *Civilization on Trial* (1948).

We study history of sorts in school textbooks and read something about it in later life, but it is the privilege, and perhaps the fate, of this generation to see the pageant of modern history sweep along, with breath-taking speed, to a climax of earth-wide proportions,

MONTHLY REVIEW

offering rapturous opportunities and fraught with dire consequences. The Suez Crisis is an episode in this pageant.

A Plutocratic President

This note is written just before the presidential election of 1956. The political campaign has been going on actively since mid-summer. The candidates, and their backers, have had an opportunity to show their hands and speak their pieces. The outcome of the struggle was predicted, accurately, four years ago: a rich man will be elected to the presidency. How could it be otherwise when each of the two major parties nominated a rich man as its candidate?

U.S. News & World Report underlined this fact in October, 1952. It repeated its prediction in a leading article appearing in its October 26, 1956, issue, under the title "Eisenhower or Stevenson—Next President a Wealthy Man."

More than two thousand years ago, Greek thinkers defined democracy as rule by the many, plutocracy as rule by the wealthy. In terms of this definition, the United States has become a plutocracy—ruled by the wealthy.

Both of the leading 1956 candidates are men of wealth. Both were supported and financed by the wealthy. Both uphold the American Way of Life, which preaches and practices the doctrine that human happiness and well-being are in direct proportion to the possession of property titles, goods, and services. Eisenhower and Stevenson both accept the proposition that success for the individual and the nation can be measured by the extent of material possessions. Throughout the months of campaigning, neither candidate discussed this basic assumption. Both accepted the proposition that personal and national security must be decided in the end by "fire-power"—the capacity to destroy and kill.

In the October *Monthly Review*, we said that the election campaign was Tweedledum versus Tweedledee. It was worse than that. Perhaps it may best be described by an analogy: A ship at sea is mortally wounded. As the vessel fills and slowly settles, the captain and first officer hurl accusations and imprecations at one another without making any attempt to find the leak or to check it. They differ only as to when and how the pumps should be started and who should man them.

BOOKS by SCOTT NEARING are sold by WELLINGTON'S,
Box 3, 346 Concord Ave., Belmont, Mass. Send for list.

Christmas Gift Offer

We want to increase our circulation. You have to solve your Xmas gift problem. Here's a way of doing both at a big saving to you:

For every NEW sub you send us, we will give you, ABSOLUTELY FREE, your choice of one of the following books ranging in price from \$1 to \$5:

THE BENDING CROSS by Ray Ginger

MAN'S WORLDLY GOODS by Leo Huberman

THE TRUTH ABOUT UNIONS by Leo Huberman

THE TREASON OF THE SENATE by David Graham Phillips

THE WORLD THE DOLLAR BUILT by Gunther Stein

You may send the sub to one address, the book to another, and a gift card to each.

Send as many subs as you like—A FREE BOOK IS YOURS WITH EVERY ONE OF THEM.

Suggested order form

MONTHLY REVIEW • 66 Barrow Street • New York 14, N. Y.
I enclose \$3.00
Send sub to:

Name _____ Address _____

City _____ Zone _____ State _____

Send book (write title) _____ to:

Name _____ Address _____

City _____ Zone _____ State _____

Gift card to each from _____

N.B. This offer ends at midnight December 31. After that our subscription rate will be increased to \$4 per year.

This offer does NOT apply to renewals—only to new subs.

NEW MR PRESS BOOKS

AMERICAN RADICALS: PROBLEMS AND PERSONALITIES
edited and with an introduction by Harvey Goldberg

Publication date March 1957

List price \$5

Prepublication price \$3

Price with one-year sub to MR \$6

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GROWTH by Paul A. Baran

Publication date April 1957

List price \$5

Prepublication price \$3

Price with one-year sub to MR \$6

THE CHINESE ECONOMY by Solomon Adler

Probable publication date May 1957

List price \$5

Prepublication price \$3

Price with one-year sub to MR \$6

THE THEORY OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT, New Printing,
by Paul M. Sweezy

Ready in January 1957

Price \$6

Price with one-year sub to MR \$8

(continued from inside front cover)

We are very proud of this publishing program, but we will not be divulging any secrets when we tell you that it is going to strain our financial resources to the utmost limit. We need your help on this, and we need it badly. What we ask for, however, is not special contributions but *advance orders accompanied by cash payment*. If you will place your own orders now and get as many of your friends as possible to do likewise, it will provide us with the capital we need not only to pay actual costs of production but, no less important, to promote the sale of the books. Details as to prices, publication dates, and combination subscription offers will be found on page 304.

We also have two new pamphlets to announce: "What You Should Know about Suez," by the editors (a reprint of the October Review of the Month), and "Marxian Socialism," by Paul M. Sweezy, from the November issue (this pamphlet also includes Sweezy's review of C. Wright Mills' *The Power Elite* from the September issue). Both pamphlets sell for 25 cents apiece, five for \$1, or 30 for \$5.

Leo Huberman has just arrived in Warsaw as we go to press, and we are hoping to have for the January issue a first-hand report from him on the momentous new developments in Poland. Prior to going to Poland, he spent a little over a month in London and Paris. One outcome of the stay in London was the arrangement with Routledge to bring out simultaneous editions of the Adler book (see above) in Britain and this country. He writes of meeting old friends and observing a ferment in the Western European Left at least as violent as anything happening in this country. Talks with high Polish officials in Paris made him extremely anxious to get along to Warsaw where some of the decisive events of postwar history are now taking place. MR and MR readers are fortunate to have so experienced an observer on the spot at this critical juncture.

I. F. Stone asks us to announce that he is arranging a meeting to celebrate the anniversary of the Bill of Rights on the subject of "Socialism: East and West." The meeting will be held at the Community Church, 40 East 35th Street, New York City, on Friday, December 14th, at 8 p.m. He will act as chairman and moderator, and is inviting representatives of a number of left publications (including MR) to participate. The list of speakers will be announced later. Admission will be \$1 (50 cents for students).

We have a considerable number of letters commenting on Professor Morrison's first science "column" which appeared in the October issue ("Toward the Synthesis of Life"). Almost all have been highly commendatory, and a few made suggestions for future science articles. Professor Morrison is very anxious to get these suggestions, so if you have any scientific questions or problems that are bothering you, don't hesitate to send them in. They will be forwarded to him and will help him to plan future columns.

There was a misprint in Scott Nearing's World Events in the October issue. The address of the Fund for the Republic was given incorrectly: it should be 60 East 42nd Street, New York 17.

The letter of the month comes from a third-year law student at one of our larger universities: "I would like, . . . to take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation of the excellent work you are performing as editors. Publications which contain carefully considered opinions and analyses of events are rare enough these days, and rarer still is a publication which applies Marxist analysis of contemporary society with such insight and boldness. The world of socialist thought would be extremely bleak but for MR, but I really believe that if socialist thought were now in its full vigor in this country, MR would be its leader by far."

Wellington's BOOK BARGAINS

Save up to 85%—While stock lasts
Brand new, jacketed, clothbound,
original editions; publishers'
remainders which may soon be
hard to find at any price.

HAROLD LASKI by Kingsley Martin. A fair,
candid & affectionate biography. 278 pp. Reg.
\$4. NOW \$1.00

BERNARD SHAW & MRS. PATRICK CAMPBELL
THEIR CORRESPONDENCE. Vivid, exciting &
candid record of a remarkable friendship.
401 pp. (\$5.) \$1.25

THE GREAT CHARLIE. Chaplin's screen per-
sonality studied by Robert Payne. Rare photos.
287 pp. Imported, \$1.75

Sartre's EXISTENTIALISM explained in his own
words. (Phil. Lib. \$2.75.) \$1.00

LIVING THOUGHTS OF TOLSTOI edited by
Stefan Zweig. Imported, SPECIAL 75c

Lillian Smith's KILLERS OF THE DREAM deals
with sin, sex, segregation, & beliefs, dreams
of man. (\$3.) 65c

PROBLEMS OF MEN by John Dewey. Parts on
Democracy & Education, Human Nature &
Scholarship, Value and Thought. 311 pp. Reg.
\$5. NOW \$1.75

F. O. Matthiessen: A COLLECTIVE PORTRAIT.
Two essays by 'Matty'; tributes by Sweeney,
Dunham, 30 others. (\$2.75.) 50c

THE WRITER IN AMERICA by Van Wyck Brooks.
Analysis of the unhappy state of writing &
criticism in US today. 203 pp. Reg. \$3.
NOW \$1.00

THE GREEK PASSION by Nikos Kazantzakis.
Highly praised by Thomas Mann & A. Schweitzer.
433 pp. 65c

THE AMERICAN by Howard Fast. Dramatic
novel about John Peter Altgeld. Reg. \$3.
NOW ONLY 45c

THE HOLY SINNER by Thomas Mann. An
inimitable retelling of fascinating medieval
legend. 338 pp. (\$3.50) \$1.00

FATE & FREEDOM, A philosophy for Americans,
by Jerome Frank (Judge, U.S. Circuit Ct.)
375 pp. (\$3) \$1.00

ALL THINGS COMMON by Claire Bishop. Ex-
citing story of Europe's "Communities of
Work." Photos (\$3) \$1.00

JACK LONDON, AMERICAN REBEL. A collec-
tion of his social writings; & biog. study by
Philip S. Foner. A fine book. 533 pp.
SPECIAL \$1.75

FROM DAY TO DAY by Odd Nansen. Epic
diary of life in Nazi prisons by son of
Norway's famous explorer. A great affirmation
of the human spirit's power to retain
faith & love in the midst of bestiality. 485
pp.; drawings. Reg. \$5. NOW \$1.00

NEW HOPES FOR A CHANGING WORLD by
Bertrand Russell. Notable affirmation of faith
in the good life. 216 pp. Reg. \$3.

NOW ONLY \$1.00

EINSTEIN'S THE WORLD AS I SEE IT. Non-
technical essays (1922-34) on life & social
problems. (\$2.75) \$1.00

OUT OF MY LATER YEARS by Albert Einstein.
Collected essays, 1934 to 1950. 282 pp. Reg.
\$4.75. NOW \$1.75

MY DEAR TIMOTHY by Victor Gollancz. Unique
memoirs of founder Left Book Club. 440 pp.
Reg. \$5. NOW 75c

POWER OF NON-VIOLENCE by Richard B.
Gregg. A classic of the pacifist position. New
edn. 253 pp. \$1.25

INTERVIEW WITH INDIA by J. F. Muhi. 'Full
of gaiety and truth'—Pearl Buck. 310 pp. Reg.
\$3.50 NOW \$1.00

PEOPLE IN COLONIES by Kumar Goshal. Fac-
tual & readable report on lives of a billion
people. (\$3.50) NOW \$1.00

LIFE LINE TO A PROMISED LAND by Ira
Hirschmann. War-time struggle of Jews to
reach Israel. (\$2.75) 50c

EXECUTION OF PRIVATE SLOVIK by William
Huie. Distressing true story of a reluctant
soldier. (\$3.50) 65c

TOMORROW IS ALREADY HERE by R. Jungk.
Disturbing picture of dehumanization of so-
ciety. 241 pp. (\$3.50) \$1.00

WELLINGTON'S, Box 3
346 Concord Ave., Belmont 78, Mass.

Please send me the books indicated.

Enclosed is my remittance of \$ _____
(books sent postpaid if payment
sent with order)

Name: _____

Address: _____

